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“Sport is and remains primarily and largely an affair of the sporting associations, but 




The football player Adnan Januzaj could choose to play at international level for 
five countries. Januzaj’s Albanian father Abedin moved from Kosovo to Belgium in 
1992 to avoid being recruited by the Yugoslav’s People’s Army. Abedin’s wife and 
Adnan’s mother, Ganimete Sadikaj, was also the victim of repression from the part of 
the Serbs and her original family was deported from Kosovo to Turkey under a plan to 
suppress Albanian nationalism. The family later moved to Belgium where Abedin and 
Ganimete met. Adnan was born in Brussels on 5 February 1995 and spent most of his 
career in Belgium before moving to England in 2011 to play for Manchester United. 
2014.2 To sum it up, he had been eligible to play for Albania, Belgium, England3, 
Kosovo4 and Turkey. Out of the five possible sporting nationalities, he finally chose the 
Belgian one and committed himself to the Belgian national team in April 2014. He 
made his official debut in the Belgian jersey in a game against Tunisia on 7 June 2014.5   
The recent history of football is littered with siblings. There may not be a more 
intriguing brotherhood than that of George, Kevin-Prince and Jérôme Boateng. They 
were all born in Berlin and have played football since their childhood. While the career 
of George was restricted to a handful of appearances for a local amateur outfit, Kevin-
                                                
1 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert, “Editorial. Bosman: One for All ...” (2015) Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law, Year 2015, Number 2, pp. 175-176.  
2 „Inside Adnan Januzaj's world: Owned by United, chased by England... the wonder boy whose parents 
escaped the Kosovo war to move to Belgium. Read his amazing story”, Mail Online, 16 October 2013, 
retrieved 10 April 2016.   
3 Januzaj’s eligibility in the national team of England is disputable. Januzaj’s eligibility relates in this 
respect to the relationship between Articles 6(2) and 7(d) of the Regulations Governing the Application of 
the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) Statutes. Januzaj does not meet the criteria 
set out in the aforementioned Article 7(d) and he would therefore need an exception from the FIFA in 
order to be eligible to play for England.  
4 Kosovo is not a member of the FIFA. Therefore, the Regulations Governing the Application of the FIFA 
Statues do not apply. As a consequence, Kosovo may field any citizen of Kosovo, even if he elected a 
national team pursuant to Article 5(2). When Kosovo becomes a full member of the FIFA, such a player 
will no longer be eligible to play for the country. 
5 „Belgium 1-0 Tunisia: Adnan Januzaj wins his first cap in hailstorm delayed victory... but Romelu 
Lukaku limps off with injury“, Mail Online, 7 June 2014, retrieved 10 April 2016.   
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Prince and Jérôme Boateng shoot to fame as professionals. Jérôme plays for Bayern 
Munich and the German national team whom he was the key figure at the winning 2014 
the FIFA World Cup in Brazil. A talented forward, Kevin-Prince had been a regular 
fixture in the Germany youth set-up. However, following several disagreements with 
the German football association, he turned his back on his country of birth and instead 
opted to represent Ghana, the birthplace of his father. The 2010 FIFA World Cup in 
South Africa witnessed a group D match between Ghana and Germany where the two 
brothers lined up on different sides of the pitch.6   
Adnan Januzaj and the Boateng brothers are examples of a long succession of 
athletes who could change or have changed the country they represent in international 
competitions during the course of their careers. Athletes can choose to represent another 
country due to their birthplace, parentage, ancestry, residence or for many other reasons. 
In any of these cases, they must comply with the respective international sporting 
governing bodies’ rules governing their eligibility in national teams. Rules coming 
under this category are most importantly quotas of naturalized athletes, waiting periods, 
rules determining the election of sporting nationality or prohibiting its change as well as 
all other regulations influencing the possibility for an athlete to represent a country of 
his choice. 
The rules governing athletes’ eligibility in international competitions form a 
noticeable part of “lex sportiva”,7 international sporting governing bodies’ own 
normative order autonomous from state legal orders until these two concepts clash 
together.8 National courts attach to these autonomous sporting rules certain value since 
they uphold claims of athletes based on these rules.9 It seems, however, that the case 
                                                
6 „George, Kevin-Prince and Jérôme Boateng: football's intriguing brothers”, Guardian, 22 April 2015, 
retrieved 10 April 2016.  
7 For more information on this context, see R. Siekmann, J. Soek (Eds.), Lex Sportiva: What is Sports 
Law? (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012). 
8 J. Exner, “Sportovní národnost ve světle práva Evropské unie” (2013) Právník, Year 152, Number 10, p. 
1031. 
9 Conseil d’Etat, Number 101894, Olympique d’Antibes Juan-les-Pins c. Fédération Française de Basket-
ball, [1989]; OGH, 2Ob232/98a, Emanuel V. v. Österreichischer Eishockey-Verband and International 
Ice Hockey Federation, [1998]; LG Wien, 26 Cg 94/87, Deutsche Eishockeybund DEB v. International 
Ice Hockey Federation, [1987]. 
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law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)10 regarding rules governing 
sporting nationality is neither homogenous nor unequivocal.11 
I submit that after the 2006 Court of Justice’s judgment in Meca-Medina & 
Majcen,12 the vast majority of sporting governing bodies’ rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in their national teams fall within the scope of European Union (EU) law. As 
Stefaan Van den Bogaert puts it, “[s]port is and remains primarily and largely an affair 
of the sporting associations, but their autonomy is conditional, for due account must be 
taken of the exigencies of EU law.”13 Therefore, sporting governing bodies must adjust 
their rules to EU law requirements with the aim of escaping the Court of Justice’s power 
to proclaim the rules incompatible with EU law. Even though these sporting governing 
bodies might be established in a non-EU country, the Court of Justice is competent to 
decide on their rules once they apply to EU citizens or in EU territory.  
The aim of this master’s thesis is to answer the question of how to grasp and 
categorize rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams in the EU. The thesis 
assesses the compliance of the rules determining sporting nationality with the concrete 
provisions of EU law regarding primarily the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality in the fields of EU citizenship, free movement of persons and 
competition.14 This master’s thesis simultaneously formulates concrete 
recommendations to sporting governing bodies in order to better adapt their rules to EU 
law requirements.  
The reasons why I have decided to write my master’s thesis right on this topic 
combine my desire to enrich contemporary jurisprudence with a comprehensive work 
on the relationship of EU law and rules governing sporting nationality with my interest 
in EU law and my passion for sport. A lot has been written about the compliance of 
general sporting rules with EU law with regard especially to the judgment of the Court 
                                                
10 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) shall include the Court of Justice, the General 
Court and specialised courts; see the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), article 19.  
11 J. Exner (2013): op. cit., p. 1031; see also J. Guillaumé, “L’autonomie de la nationalité sportive“ (2011) 
Journal du droit international, Number 2, pp. 313-336. 
12 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492.  
13 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2015): op. cit., pp. 175-176.  
14 Since this master’s thesis concerns mainly athletes’ rights stemming from EU citizenship, free 
movement of persons and competition, I further refer to these three undoubtedly specific categories of EU 
law generally also as to athletes’ rights under EU law.  
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of Justice in Bosman15 in 1995. As to the relation of specific rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in their national teams with EU law, some of its partial aspects have been 
covered by authors, namely Jean-Philippe Dubey,16 Stefaan Van den Bogaert,17 Yann 
Haffner,18 Denis Oswald,19 Richard Parrish20 or Stephen Weatherill21 whose work I 
draw my inspiration from in this master’s thesis. On the other hand, no comprehensive 
work covering all different sides of this issue and bringing its complex overview exists 
up to now to my knowledge. My concern for EU law and sport as well as my 
determination to enrich current state of jurisprudence with a work on partially 
unexplored topic are my main reasons to write this master’s thesis.       
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Legal status of international sports 
federations and their rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams is initially 
discussed (Chapter 1). Subsequently, the general framework for assessing the 
compliance of rules determining sporting nationality is introduced (Chapter 2). Close 
attention is then paid to the case law of the CJEU in the domain of these specific 
sporting rules with the focus on the turning judgment of the Court of Justice Meca-
Medina & Majcen from 2006 (Chapter 3).  
The main focus of this master’s thesis lies in Chapter 4, which, employing the 
analytical method of research, divides rules governing sporting nationality into three 
categories according to the future attitude of the CJEU to these rules, which might be 
expected towards the background of its current case law. This thesis firstly considers 
whether sports rules fall within the scope of EU law and therefore cannot escape review 
of EU judicial authorities. If so, it is assessed whether the sporting rules constitute a 
                                                
15 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463.   
16 J.-P. Dubey, “Nationalité sportive : une notion autonome” (2006) in D. Oswald (Ed.),  La nationalité 
dans le sport: enjeux et problèmes : actes du Congrès des 10 et 11 novembre 2005 , (Editions CIES, 
2004). 
17 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert, Practical Regulation of the Mobility of Sportsmen in the EU Post Bosman, 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005). 
18 Y. Hafner, “Athletes’ eligibility in national team and EU law : What can we learn from two doped 
swimmers ?” in A. Rigozzi, D. Sprumont, Y. Hafner (Eds.), Citius, Altius, Fortius - Mélanges en 
l’honneur de Denis Oswald, (Helbing & Lichtenhahn (Bâle), 2012).  
19 D. Oswald (Ed.),  La nationalité dans le sport: enjeux et problèmes : actes du Congrès des 10 et 11 
novembre 2005 , (Editions CIES, 2004), p. 200; D. Oswald, La nationalité dans le sport, Contributions 
pour le XIIème Congrès Olympique (Lausanne, 2009), p. 58.  
20 R. Parrish, “Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch [1974] ECR 1405” in J. Anderson (Ed.), Leading Cases 
in Sports Law, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013). 
21 S. Weatherill, European Sports Law - Collected Papers, 2nd ed. (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014).  
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restriction to the citizenship, free movement and competition provisions. Finally, the 
justification and the proportionality of the restrictions are discussed (Chapter 4).  
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1. The legal character of international sporting governing 
bodies and their rules governing sporting nationality  
Regarding the concept of sporting nationality, international sporting governing 
bodies play a crucial role since they set up and enforce rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in national teams. In this chapter, legal status of international sporting 
governing bodies is discussed along with regulatory autonomy that they possess while 
regulating both their internal issues and enacting rules applying externally (1.1.). 
Subsequently, the legal character of rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national 
teams is examined (1.2.). 
1.1. The legal status of international sporting governing bodies 
International sports federations22 are non-governmental organisations – private 
entities, which govern one or more sports at international level and, in order to do so, 
they are equipped with regulatory power to define their respective rules. The Olympic 
Charter defines international sports federations as “non-governmental organisations 
administering one or several sports at World level and encompassing organisations 
administering such sports at national level.”23 Pursuant to the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, a sports organisation is “any 
organisation which governs sport or one particular sport […] as well as its continental 
and national affiliated organisations […].”24 In order to pursuit their goals, sporting 
governing bodies have “the right to establish autonomous decision-making processes 
within the law”, as provided for by the European Sports Charter.25  
International sporting governing bodies are private entities or non-governmental 
organizations, which are established in the form of an unregistered contract between the 
organization’s members as foundations, trusts or societies or registered according to the 
national law of a country where they are established or where they undertake their 
activities. As such, these international sports federations must comply with the 
respective national laws as well as with other legal orders binding on their countries. In 
                                                
22 Annex I to this master’s thesis provides a list of all international sports organizations.  
23 Olympic Charter (2015), rule 25.  
24 Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (2014), article 3.2.  
25 European Sports Charter (1992, revised 2001), article 3.  
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the case of EU Member States, these organizations must therefore comply also with EU 
law. It is true that a lot of international governing bodies, including the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), have their seat in Switzerland26 – a non-EU country, but EU 
authorities have the power to scrutinize them to the extent they apply to EU citizens of 
on EU territory.27  
The character and powers of international sports federations are elaborated in 
detail in the Olympic Charter - the codification of the fundamental principles of 
Olympism and the rules and bye-laws adopted by the International Olympic Committee, 
which is “the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement, which brings together the 
various international sporting federations.”28 The fifth fundamental principle of 
Olympism, recognising that sport occurs within the framework of society, provides that 
sports organisations within the Olympic Movement shall have the rights and obligations 
of autonomy, which include freely establishing and controlling the rules of sport. They 
shall also freely determine the structure and governance of their organisations and enjoy 
the right of elections free from any outside influence and the responsibility for ensuring 
that principles of good governance are applied.29  
The mission and the various roles of international federations within the Olympic 
Movement are expressed in the rule 26 of the Olympic Charter. Their tasks are, amongst 
others, to establish and enforce, in accordance with the Olympic spirit, the rules 
concerning the practice of their respective sports and to ensure their application; to 
ensure the development of their sports throughout the World; to contribute to the 
achievement of the goals set out in the Olympic Charter, in particular by way of the 
spread of Olympism and Olympic education; to support the IOC in the review of 
                                                
26 Switzerland is home to more international sports federations and governing bodies than anywhere else 
in the world. Since 1915, when Lausanne was chosen as the seat of the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC), more than 50 international sports organizations have established their headquarters in Switzerland. 
27 On the legal status of the most important international sporting governing body – the International 
Olympic Committee (IOC), see inter alia A. M. Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games, (T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2009), pp. 256; see also D. J. Ettinger, “The Legal Status of the International Olympic Committee”, 
(1992) Pace International Law Review, Volume 4, Issue 1, 97-121.  
28 Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2004] EU:T:2004:282, paragraph 1; see 
also Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 2.  
29 Olympic Charter (2015), Fundamental Principles of Olympism, principle 5. 
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candidatures for organising the Olympic Games for their respective sports or to assume 
the responsibility for the control and direction of their sports at the Olympic Games.30  
Regarding other international multisport competitions held under the patronage 
of the IOC, international sports federations can assume or delegate responsibility for the 
control and direction of their sports. They are also called upon to provide technical 
assistance in the practical implementation of the Olympic Solidarity programmes and to 
encourage and support measures relating to the medical care and health of athletes. In 
addition, they have the right to formulate proposals addressed to the IOC concerning the 
Olympic Charter and the Olympic Movement; to collaborate in the preparation of 
Olympic Congresses and to participate, on request from the IOC, in the activities of the 
IOC commissions.31 International sporting governing bodies regulating non-Olympic 
sports are endowed with similar powers and responsibilities.32  
 International sporting governing bodies constitute a part of and operate within 
the pyramidal structure of sport. Within the Olympic Movement, the IOC sits atop the 
mountain. It stands above international sports federations governing Olympic sports and 
these federations are bound by the IOC’s decisions. International organisations 
regulating non-Olympic sports are themselves placed at the top of the pyramid. They 
further unify continental organizations governing certain sport at continental level. At 
the bottom of the pyramid structure, there are national sports federations endowed with 
the task of regulating the sport in their respective countries.  
Football can be used as a good example of how the sports pyramid functions in 
practice. The FIFA33 is the football World governing body, sitting at the top of the 
pyramid. One level down, there are six continental confederations recognized by the 
FIFA, which oversee the game in the different continents and regions of the World.34 
The continental confederations are provided for in the FIFA's statutes and membership 
of a confederation is a prerequisite to the FIFA membership. However, 209 national 
                                                
30 Olympic Charter (2015), rule 26. 
31 Ibid. 
32 J. Exner (2013): op. cit., p.1030.  
33 FIFA’s website is available on http://www.FIFA.com.  
34 FIFA Statutes (2015), rule 20. These confederations are Asian Football Confederation (AFC; 46 
members), Confederation of African Football (CAF; 54 members), Confederation of North, Central 
American and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF; 41 members), Confederación 
Sudamericana de Fútbol, (CONMEBOL; 10 members), Oceania Football Confederation (OFC; 11 
members) and Union of European Football Associations (UEFA; 53 members).  
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associations standing at the bottom of the pyramid, and not the continental 
confederations, are members of the FIFA.35 Interestingly, the FIFA has more members 
than the United Nations as it recognizes certain entities as distinct nations, such as the 
four Home Nations within the United Kingdom36 and politically disputed territories 
such as Palestine.37 
In order to exercise their rights and obligations, international sports federations 
may set up their own governing bodies and establish “autonomous decision-making 
processes”38 pursuant to the law of the country where they were established or where 
their seat is situated. The FIFA, for example, is an association established under Swiss 
law, with its seat in Zürich. The FIFA Congress is the organisation’s supreme and 
legislative body.39 It is an assembly composed of representatives from each affiliated 
member association, which each have one vote. The FIFA Congress makes decisions 
relating to the FIFA's governing statutes and their method of implementation and 
application. The congress approves the annual report, and decides on the acceptance of 
new national associations and holds elections. Congress also elects the President of the 
FIFA, its General Secretary, and the other members of the FIFA's Executive Committee 
on the year following the FIFA World Cup.40 FIFA's Executive Committee is the main 
decision-making and executive body of the FIFA.41 It is composed of 25 people: the 
President, 8 Vice Presidents and 16 members, of whom at least one must be a woman. 
The Executive Committee is the body that decides which country will host the World 
Cup.42 The President and General Secretary are the main officeholders of the FIFA and 
are in charge of its daily administration carried out by the General Secretariat with its 
staff of approximately 280 members.43 Furthermore, the FIFA's organizational structure 
consists of several other bodies under authority of the Executive Committee or created 
by Congress as standing committees. Amongst those bodies, there are the FIFA 
                                                
35 FIFA Statutes (2015), definition 10.  
36 These four Home nations of the United Kingdom are England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  
37 „Palestine Football: Escape to Victory?“, Bruisedearth, 27 October 2008, retrieved 10 April 2016. 
38 European Sports Charter (1992, revised 2001), Article 3.  
39 FIFA Statutes (2015), definition 8.  
40 FIFA Statutes (2015), rules 22-29. 
41 FIFA Statutes (2015), definition 9. 
42 FIFA Statutes (2015), rules 30-31.  
43 FIFA Statutes (2015), rules 32 and 71-72.  
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Emergency Committee, the Finance Committee, the Disciplinary Committee, and the 
Referees Committee.44 
Decisions of international sporting governing bodies are binding on their 
affiliated continental or national associations as well as on any athlete or player 
engaging in sport in an official competition recognized by its governing body. Within 
the pyramid structure of a respective sport, international sporting governing bodies’ 
rulings are final. However, their decision can still be reversed by an appeal to a court or 
to the CAS,45 an institution established with the idea of being the “Supreme Court of 
World Sport”46 that is independent of any international sports federation, which 
provides for services in order to facilitate the settlement of sports-related disputes 
through arbitration or mediation by means of procedural rules adapted to the specific 
needs of the sports World.47 
1.2. Rules governing sporting nationality 
One of the main tasks of international sporting governing bodies in the process 
of regulation of sport at international level is to establish criteria pertaining to athletes’ 
eligibility for their national teams. In other words, international sports federations are 
responsible for determination of requirements that athletes need to fulfil in order to be 
able to represent their countries in international competitions. When doing so, 
international federations and organisers of multi-sport competitions must seek to 
balance their interest and values with the legitimate rights of athletes.48  
                                                
44 FIFA Statutes (2015), rules 33-60. 
45 Article 75 of the Swiss Civil Code, which is a mandatory provision of the Swiss law, allows for an 
appeal to a court or an arbitral tribunal. International sporting governing bodies may decide whether the 
CAS has jurisdiction to rule on a specific issue. On the other hand, if the dispute in question is not 
covered by the arbitration clause, the Swiss courts have jurisdiction to rule on the dispute.  
46 Former IOC President Jean Antonio Samaranch initiated the foundation of the CAS as the “Supreme 
Court of World Sport”. See for example R. MacLaren, “Twenty-Five Years of the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport: A look in the rear-view mirror” (2010), Marquette Sports Law Review, p. 306.    
47 For the status and functioning of the CAS see Code of Sports-related Arbitration (in force as from 
January 2016) and the CAS’s website: http://www.tas-cas.org/en/index.html; Regarding the relationship 
of EU law and the CAS, see A. Duval, “The Court of Arbitration for Sport and EU Law. Chronicle of an 
Encounter” (2015) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Year 2015, Number 2.  
48 Y. Hafner, “Change in Sporting Nationality : the “Next Bosman”?” (2008) Olympic Capital Quarterly, 
October 2008, Vol. 3, Number 4, p. 2. 
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In the 20th century, legal nationality was the exclusive criteria governing 
athletes’ eligibility in their national teams.49 International Court of Justice (ICJ) defined 
legal nationality in 1955 in the famous Nottebohm case as “legal bond having at its basis 
a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”50 According to the ICJ, legal 
nationality constitutes the juridical expression of the fact that an individual, upon whom 
it is conferred either directly by the law or as a result of an act of the authorities, is in 
fact more closely connected with the population of the state conferring nationality than 
with that of any other state.51 
However, primarily the increased athletes’ cross-border mobility at the turn of 
millennium52 undermined the exclusivity of the criterion of legal nationality in 
determination of athletes’ eligibility in their national teams.53 Moreover, certain states 
have been determined to gain prestige through their athletes’ success at international 
level54 and they have therefore been naturalising top athletes and welcoming those who 
are interested only in being sporting mercenaries.55 These factors, even including 
“nation shopping”, lead to the conclusion that nowadays, legal nationality can no longer 
be considered the sole ratio for determining the criteria of eligibility of athletes to 
compete for their national teams at international level.56 
                                                
49 On the influence and implications of legal nationality in sports see M. Pautot, Sport et nationalité. 
Quelle place pour les joueurs étrangers?, (L’Harmattan, 2014), pp. 269; A. Calmat, “Sport et 
nationalisme” (1992) Pouvoirs n°61 - Le sport, pp. 51-56; A. Hervé, “Les problèmes éthiques de la 
nationalité dans le sport” (2009) Colloque international Ethique et sport en Europe, Université Rennes II, 
Rennes : France, pp. 1-10.  
50 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955: 4, 23; see European Convention on 
Nationality, article 2, for a very similar definition.  
51 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), ICJ Reports 1955: 4, 23. 
52 Athletes’ eligibility in national teams became an issue even earlier. There are examples of athletes 
changing their eligibility during the ancient Olympic Games in Greece (To this end, see  Y. Hafner, 
“Sporting Nationality in the Ancient and Modern Olympic Games” (2009) Proceedings of the 17th 
International Seminar on Olympic Studies for Postgraduate Students, International Olympic Academy, 
Ancient Olympia).  
53 CAS 2007/A/1377, Mélanie Rinaldi v. Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA), [2007].  
54 A. M. Mestre (2009): op. cit., p. 75.  
55 Y. Hafner (2008), op. cit., p. 1.  
56 D. Oswald (2004): op. cit., p. 200; M. Lajous, “Jeux et enjeux autours des questions de nationalité 
sportive” in M. Attali, N. Bazoge (Ed.), Diriger le sport. Perspectives sur la gouvernance du sport du xxe 
siècle à nos jours, (CNRS Editions, 2012), p. 286.  
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Reflecting these new factors, international sporting governing bodies57 have 
consequently started including in their regulations other requirements determining 
athletes’ eligibility for national teams. “[E]ach international federation and every 
organiser of multi-sports competition, including the IOC, have adopted their own rules 
regarding athletes’ [eligibility in national teams], each with their own aims of providing 
continuity for their competitions but also to avoid issues linked to mercenaries and 
athletes’ mobility.58 The conditions determining athletes’ country of representation 
relate typically to the place of birth59 or the place of residence.60 Another example of 
these rules is the “waiting period”, requiring from an athlete having changed his 
nationality to abstain from participation in international competitions for a certain 
period of time.61  
The practice of international sporting governing bodies consisting in creating 
new elements of rules governing athletes’ eligibility for national teams led to the 
creation of “sporting nationality”. Even though there is no common definition of 
sporting nationality within international sports federations,62 the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) recognized this notion for the first time in 1993 in B. v. International 
Basketball Federation (FIBA) and stated that sporting nationality is a “uniquely sporting 
concept, defining the eligibility rules of players with a view to their participation in 
international competitions.”63 What is more, some international sports federations, for 
example the International Skating Union (ISU), have established eligibility rules not 
only for athletes but also for officials, referees and judges.64  
Sporting nationality is a different notion from that of legal nationality and these 
two concepts do not always necessarily need to overlap. Sporting nationality, as a 
concept of international sporting governing bodies as private entities, differs from a 
                                                
57 Also referred to as international sports associations, international sports federations or international 
sports organisations. 
58 Y. Hafner (2008): op. cit., p. 1.  
59 J.-P. Dubey (2006): op. cit., p. 37. 
60 J. A. R. Nafziger, International Sports Law, 2nd ed. (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), p. 133.  
61 J. P. McCutcheon, “National eligibility rules after Bosman” in A. Caiger (Ed.), Professional Sport in 
the EU:Regulation and Re-Regulation, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001), p. 127.  
62 Y. Hafner (2008): op. cit., p. 1. 
63 CAS 92/80, B. v. International Basketball Federation (FIBA), [1993], M. Reeb (Ed.), Recueil des 
sentences du TAS Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998, (1998, Staempfli Editions), Number 15, p. 304. Y. 
Hafner (2012): op. cit., p. 216.  
64 ISU Special Regulations & Technical Rules, Single and Pair Skating & Ice Dance (2014), rules 411, 
412, 413.  
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public law concept of legal nationality, which concerns rather “the personal status 
deriving from citizenship of one or more states.”65 From 1993 on, CAS panels have 
consistently upheld this dualism when concluding that legal and sporting nationalities 
may differ.66 Therefore, one can be presented with two specific situations. An athlete 
can be legally a national of a certain country but not be eligible to represent that country 
at international level. Conversely, an athlete does not have to be a national of a country 
but can still be eligible to represent it in international sporting events.67  
The fact that there is no “harmonization” amongst the IOC and international 
federations who independently set their eligibility criteria brings some complicated 
situations.68 For example, an athlete who may qualify in a country for one sport, might 
not be eligible to qualify under the same conditions for a different sport.69 Different 
authors have proposed different solutions in order to simplify this issue. Yann Hafner 
claims that sporting world should refine the concept of sporting nationality and adopt a 
more comprehensive and integrated set of rules. He suggests that if an athlete has 
gained eligibility under a certain set of rules, this acquisition should be recognised by 
other international sporting governing bodies.70 A Swiss professor Denis Oswald 
proposes the creation of the Olympic sporting nationality that would govern athletes’ 
eligibility in their national teams within the Olympic Movement.71 Dora Kostakopoulou 
and Annette Schrauwen introduce a “participatory growth model” with relatively 
flexible naturalization criteria and residence requirements.72 Finally, Anna Sabrina 
Wollmann, Olivier Vonk and Gerard-René de Groot advocate a “sporting licence” of 
the country of which athletes are nationals that would avoid confusions as to whether a 
                                                
65 Ibid.  
66 CAS 98/2009, Spanish Basketball Federation (FEB) / International Basketball Federation (FIBA), 
[1999],  M. Reeb (Ed.), Recueil des sentences du TAS Digest of CAS Awards II 1998 – 2000, (Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), Number 9, p. 503; CAS 98/215, International Baseball Association (IBA), 
Advisory Opinion, [1999], M. Reeb (2002): op. cit., p. 701.  
67 J.-P. Dubey (2006): op. cit., p. 37. 
68 A. S. Wollmann, O. Vonk, G. R. de Groot, “Towards a sporting nationality?” (2015) Maastricht journal 
of European and comparative law, Vol. 22, Number 2, p. 305-306.  
69 R. Siekmann, “Sport and Nationality : « Accelerated’ Naturalisation for National Representative 
Purposes and Discrimination Issues in Individual Team Competitions under EU law” (2011) The 
International Sports Law Journal 85, Vol. 3-4, p. 241-268.  
70 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., pp. 215-238.  
71 D. Oswald, “Nationalité dans le sport” in P. Cholley (Eds.), Treizième [XIIIe] Congrès olympique, 
Copenhague 2009 : contributions, (Comité International Olympique, 2009), pp. 71-74.   
72 D. Kostakopoulou, A. Schrauwen, “Olympic Citizenship and the (Un)Specialness of the National Vest: 
Rethinking the Link between Sport and Citizenship Law” (2014), 10 International Journal of Law in 
Context, pp. 143-162. 
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sporting nationality includes some of the rights and obligations linked to the concept of 
legal nationality.73 However, this theoretical dispute is not an object of this master’s 
thesis, which rather focuses on the compliance of sporting nationality with EU law. 
                                                
73 A. S. Wollmann, O. Vonk, G. R. de Groot (2015): op. cit., p. 305-321. 
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2. General framework for assessing the compliance of rules 
governing sporting nationality with European Union law 
This chapter provides a general overview of the framework within which the 
CJEU operates when it assesses the compliance of sporting rules with EU law. Even 
though the CJEU has not yet decided upon the concrete rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in national teams,74 it is my opinion that it will engage in the same analysis 
when dealing with these rules as it has used in past cases, since it applies a very similar 
approach to all sporting rules without greatly distinguishing them according to their 
specificities. In this respect, the CJEU follows a three-step test that is generally used for 
an assessment of compliance of any measure with EU law in the internal market.75 The 
CJEU firstly considers whether sports rules fall within the scope of EU law and 
therefore cannot escape review of EU judicial authorities (2.1). If so, it is assessed 
whether the sporting rules constitute a restriction to the citizenship, free movement and 
competition law provisions (2.2). Finally, the justification and the proportionality of the 
restrictions are examined (2.3.).76  
2.1 Do sports rules fall within the scope of European Union law? 
The opening step on the journey of assessing the compliance of rules governing 
athletes’ eligibility in national teams with EU law is the determination as to whether EU 
law actually applies to these rules and if so, what provisions of EU law must be taken 
into account. In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I will demonstrate why I believe that rules set by 
international sporting governing bodies that control athletes’ sporting nationality fall 
within the scope of EU law. In the 1974 judgment in Walrave, the Court of Justice 
started a line of its case law pursuant to which issues regarding the composition of 
national teams have fallen outside the sphere of competence of EU institutions for their 
                                                
74 J. Exner (2012), op. cit., p. 1031. 
75 For a general overview of the application of this test to the free movement of persons and services, see 
C. Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, The Four Freedoms, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2013), 
pp. 229-576.  
76 This division is nicely illustrated for example in Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] 
EU:C:2000:201, First, the Court of Justice assesses whether Mr Lehtonen and respective basketball rules 
fall within the scope of EU law (paragraphs 32-46). Thereafter, the existence of an obstacle to freedom of 
movement for workers is examined (paragraphs 47-50). Finally, the Court of Justice engages in exploring 
whether such a restriction can be justified (paragraphs 51-59).  
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purely sporting nature.77 In Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis, I will present arguments to 
show why I consider this statement to be no longer relevant.  
In 2006, the Court of Justice, reflecting the contemporary economic character 
and impact of sporting rules switched its approach and decided that “the mere fact that a 
rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of 
the Treaty78 the person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which 
has laid it down.”79 In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice broadened the 
category of sporting rules, which have been, from that point on, subject to potential EU 
law scrutiny.80  
In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice further added that “[if] the 
sporting activity in question falls within the scope of the Treaty, the conditions for 
engaging in it are then subject to all the obligations which result from the various 
provisions of the Treaty.”81 The prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality, enshrined in Article 18 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) and further specified in the following provisions of TFEU, sometimes 
accompanied by the market access element, is a leading principle when it comes to the 
assessment of the compliance of sporting rules with EU law (2.1.1). In this context, the 
provisions specifying the general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination 
are the citizenship of the Union (2.1.2), the freedom of movement for workers (2.1.3), 
the freedom to provide services (2.1.4), the freedom of establishment (2.1.5) and 
competition law (2.1.6).  
2.1.1 The principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination 
The general principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination is “one of the 
fundamental principles of EU law”82 and one of the most important substantive rights 
                                                
77 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, [1974] 
EU:C:1974:140.  
78 The term “Treaty” covers not only the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union (TFEU), but it rather compresses EU law in general including also 
secondary legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).   
79 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 27.  
80 P. Hamerník, “Jaká je míra tolerance práva EU vůči sportovním asociacím?” (2009) Právník, Year 150, 
Number 5, pp. 482-483.  
81 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 28. 
82 Joined cases C-117/76 and C-16/77, Ruckdeschel and Others v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen, 
[1977] EU:C:1977:160, paragraph 7.  
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that EU law has conferred on its beneficiaries from the historical perspective.83 The 
principle of equal treatment was one of the first targets of European legislative 
authorities within the process of the European integration together with the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of sex today enshrined primarily in Article 157 TFEU.84 It 
is only in last twenty years that the attention has shifted also to equal treatment based on 
race, religion, sexual orientation or age.85  
Nowadays, this crucial principle of EU law is specified, in particular, in the 
general prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality enshrined in Article 18 
TFEU. This provision states that “[w]ithin the scope of application of the Treaties, and 
without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” In the most general sense of the principle of 
equal treatment between national of different Member States, “comparable situation 
must not be treated differently and […] different situations must not be treated in the 
same way.”86 The prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality seeks to 
prevent arbitrary or unjustifiable unequal treatment between nationals of the host and 
the other Member States as well as such a treatment when one Member State treats 
nationals of a concrete Member State more favourably than nationals of another 
Member State in situations falling under EU law.87 Despite the quite general wording of 
Article 18 TFEU, the Court of Justice has progressively specified that this provision has 
always a vertical and sometimes even a horizontal direct effect.88 In that case, the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality is directed towards the EU 
institutions and other bodies, Member States’ authorities, but also towards private 
entities including international sporting governing bodies.   
Article 18 TFEU and other discrimination-prohibiting provisions of the Treaties 
forbid not only direct discrimination on grounds of nationality, but they simultaneously 
                                                
83 T. Tridimas, The general principles of EU law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 118.  
84 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957), Article 7: „Within the field of 
application of this Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein, any 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be prohibited.” The right to equal remuneration 
without discrimination based on sex was enshrined in Article 119 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community.  
85 P. Craig, G. de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 612.  
86 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, [2003] ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, paragraph 31.  
87 C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., pp. 17-18.  
88 T. Tridimas (2006): op. cit., p. 119.  
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aim at preventing indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination represents different 
treatment of persons in comparable situations explicitly on grounds of nationality. A 
directly discriminatory measure results in prohibited different treatment in law and in 
fact.89 Conversely, indirect discrimination covers different treatment of persons in a 
comparable situations based on an apparently neutral ground. Distinctively from 
directly discriminatory measures, indirectly discriminatory measures are equally 
applicable in law, but result in different factual treatment. Residence requirements, 
which can be found in many international sporting governing bodies’ regulations, are an 
example of an indirect discriminatory measure and therefore require further scrutiny 
from the EU law point of view.90    
Having seen the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, the Court 
of Justice subsequently broadened the scope of application of the free movement 
provisions so as to include also genuinely non-discriminatory measures, comprising the 
element of market access. In many cases, including Bosman, the Court of Justice hold 
that a measure which is liable to hamper, or make less attractive the exercise of the right 
to free movement may amount to a restriction to the freedom of movement guaranteed 
in the Treaty. As a result, even non-discriminatory measures may conflict with the 
Treaty right to free movement, requiring a justification under EU law.91 
The general prohibition of discrimination under Article 18 TFEU finds its lex 
specialis in specific treaty provisions regarding EU citizenship, free movement and 
competition law elaborated on in detail in the following sections. It is settled case law of 
the CJEU that the general principle of equal treatment contained in Article 18 TFEU 
can be invoked independently only where no specific provision applies.92 On the other 
hand, these specific provisions regarding the prohibition of nationality, such as 
citizenship, free movement or competition, must be interpreted in the light of Article 18 
                                                
89 M. Davies, Nationality Discrimination in the European Internal Market, (Kluwer Law International, 
2003), p. 22-31.  
90 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 20.  
91 Ibid.  
92 See inter alia Case C-10/90, Masgio v. Bundesknappschaft, [1982] EU:C:1991:107; Case C-419/92, 
Scholz v. Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda, [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:62.  
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TFEU and such measures violating these specific provisions are also automatically 
incompatible with the general principle contained in Article 18 TFEU.93 
In the following parts, each of the aforementioned specific provisions of the 
Treaties prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality is separately discussed. 
Particular attention is paid to the question of the application of these principles on rules 
of international sporting governing bodies.  
2.1.2 Citizenship of the European Union  
The citizenship of the EU, which is destined to be “the fundamental status of 
nationals of the Member States”94, has become an important new complex of rights 
granting equal treatment even to those who are not directly economically active. This 
concept first appeared in the Treaties with the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, in effect 
from 1993, and since then, the EU has witnessed “a glorious march of European 
citizenship from a “meaningless addition” to the Treaties to one of the key concepts of 
[EU] law.”95 Since it is neither suitable nor possible to give a complex overview of EU 
citizenship in this limited space, I further limit myself to the importance of EU 
citizenship for the regulation of sport.  
Originally, individuals fell under EU law in so far as they engaged in an 
economic activity, which was needed for the application of the provisions of the 
Treaties regarding the free movement of workers, services and the freedom of 
establishment. With EU citizenship, however, they find themselves within the scope of 
EU law by exercising their citizenship rights under Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, most 
importantly the right to free movement to and residence in another Member State than 
that of their origin. In other words, they no longer need to exercise an economic activity 
in order to find shelter under an EU umbrella.  
In the light of the foregoing, the citizenship of the Union has a particular 
importance for amateur sportsmen96 who not only possess the rights guaranteed directly 
                                                
93 See inter alia Case C-305/87, Commission v. Greece, [1989] EU:C:1989:218, paragraph 12. 
94 See inter alia Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, [2001] EU:C:2001:458, paragraph 31.   
95 D. Kochenov, “Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship 
between Status and Rights” (2009), Columbia Journal of European Law 2, p. 173.  
96 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 24.  
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by EU citizenship, but they also have the right to equal treatment contained in Article 
18 TFEU. In this respect, even national regulation of amateur sportsmen must ensure 
equal treatment in situations falling within the scope of EU law.97 Regarding third 
country nationals, they enjoy derived rights as family members of EU citizens who have 
made use of their rights under the Directive No. 2004/38, the so called “citizens’ rights 
directive”.98 Thus, national regulation of amateur sportsmen may in that regard also 
need to ensure equal treatment of EU citizens as well as of their family members - third 
country nationals.99 
2.1.3 Free movement of workers 
Freedom of movement for workers, like the general prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, is one the fundamental principles of EU law.100 Article 45 (2) 
TFEU, the elementary provision of the Treaties governing this freedom, provides that it 
“shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of 
the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work 
and employment.” The wording of this provision makes it clear that the principle of 
equal treatment constitutes the conceptual basis for the free movement of workers 
within the EU.101  
Article 45 (3) TFEU further specifies that the freedom of movement for workers 
shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health, to accept offers of employment actually made and to move 
freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose. It further guarantees the 
right to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the 
provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action and the right to remain in the territory of a Member 
                                                
97 Ibid.: 28. 
98 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77-123.  
99 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 28.  
100 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 93.  
101 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 18.  
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State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be 
embodied in regulations to be drawn up by the European Commission. 
Article 45 TFEU has the horizontal direct effect and can therefore be invoked by 
athletes against international sporting governing bodies. It is the settled case-law of the 
Court of Justice that Article 45 TFEU does not cover solely the actions of public 
authorities, but it extends also to any other rules or measures aimed at regulating gainful 
employment in a collective manner.102 The limitation of the application of Article 45 
TFEU only to acts of public authorities would risk the outcome of inequality in its 
application, since working conditions in various Member States are governed not only 
by law of regulation, but sometimes also by collective agreements and other acts of 
private persons.103  
The Court of Justice applied this general principle to international sporting 
governing bodies in its landmark ruling in Bosman confirming that the freedom of 
movement for workers applies equally to regulations of the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA).104 As the comprehensive opinion of the Advocate General Lenz 
shows, the conclusions of this judgment do not have to remain limited only to football, 
but can be transmitted also to other sports.105 Therefore, the horizontal direct affect of 
Article 45 TFEU can be simultaneously invoked against all international sporting 
governing bodies. 
Many athletes who undertake their activities in Europe are third country 
nationals and as such, they enjoy limited protection under EU law. As to the freedom of 
movement for workers, third country nationals have in particular derived rights as 
family members of EU citizens who have made use of their rights under the Directive 
No. 2004/38106 in conjunction with the Regulation No. 492/2011 on freedom of 
                                                
102 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 82.  
103 For a landmark judgment of the Court of Justice illustrating the application of this principle see Case 
C-281/98, Angonese, [2000] EU:C:2000:296; see also Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in 
individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European Commission, 2010): 17.  
104 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463; see also O. Poruban, “Priama diskriminácia na základe štátnej 
príslušnosti pri výkone športovej činnosti” (2015), Učená právnická spoločnosť [online], 6 May 2015.  
105 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, opinion of the Advocate General Lenz.  
106 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
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movement for workers within the EU.107 They may also benefit directly from the rights 
conferred upon them in international agreements concluded between EU and their 
respective countries. In Simutenkov, the Court of Justice decided that a Russian football 
player, who legally resided and was legally employed in Spain, could directly benefit 
from the prohibition of discrimination regarding working conditions set by the 
Partnership Agreement with Russia in relation to host Member State nationals.108 The 
Court of Justice reached similar conclusions in Kolpak and Kahveci.”109 
2.1.4 Freedom to provide services 
Freedom to provide services is another special reflection of the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality in the Treaties. Article 56 TFEU 
states that “[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited in respect of nationals 
of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that of the person 
for whom the services are intended.” Subsequently, Article 57 TFEU provides that 
[w]ithout prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right of 
establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue 
his activity in the Member State where the service is provided, under the same 
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.”  
The prohibition of discrimination lies at the centre of the freedom to provide 
services. Despite some initial doubts or ambivalence concerning the functioning of the 
principle of equal treatment in this regard, which my be caused by the general wording 
of Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, Article 61 TFEU provides that “[as] long as restrictions on 
freedom to provide services have not been abolished, each Member State shall apply 
such restrictions without distinction on grounds of nationality or residence to all persons 
providing services within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 56.” Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                          
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, pp. 77-123.  
107 Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April on freedom of 
movement for workers within the Union, OJ L 141, 27.5.2011, pp. 1–12. 
108 Case C-265/03, Simutenkov, [2005] EU:C:2005:213; see also Study on the equal treatment of non-
nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European Commission, 2010): 17. 
109 Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund, [2003] EU:C:2003:255; Case C-152/08, Real Sociedad de 
Fútbol and Kahveci, [2008] EU:C:2008:450.  
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the CJEU has regularly perceived the freedom to provide services as a specific 
expression of the general principle of equal treatment or non-discrimination.110 
It is the settled case law of the CJEU that the provisions on the free movement of 
services have direct effect and can therefore be relied upon by private entities. In this 
respect, the Court of Justice ruled in Walrave that the prohibition of discrimination 
“does not only apply to the action of public authorities but extends likewise to rules of 
any other nature aimed in regulating in a collective manner gainful employment and the 
provision of services.”111 In Laval, the Court of Justice ruled that “[t]he abolition […] of 
obstacles to the freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of 
State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal 
autonomy by associations or organisations not governed by public law.”112 The Court of 
Justice therefore enabled athletes to invoke such provisions also against international 
sporting governing bodies.113 
The Court of Justice’s judgment in Donà provides an example of the application 
of the freedom to provide services to sport. This case concerned direct nationality 
discrimination in professional football. The Court of Justice held that in so far as sport 
was practiced as economic activity, nationality discrimination was in principle 
prohibited. On the other hand, the Court of Justice accepted rules excluding “foreign 
players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only […].”114 The Court of Justice nevertheless underlined that such 
rules must remain limited to their proper objectives.115 In this particular case, the Court 
of Justice found that the Italian national measure went beyond what was necessary to 
attain its objectives and hold the rule incompatible with EU law.116  
                                                
110 Case C-33/74, Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, [1974] 
EU:C:1974:131; see also Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, 
(Brussel: European Commission, 2010): 19.  
111 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, [1974] 
EU:C:1974:140, paragraph 17; on the horizontal direct effect see, in general, M. Tomášek, V. Týč (Eds.), 
Právo Evropské unie (Leges, 2013), pp. 65-74.  
112 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, [2007] EU:C:2007:809, paragraph 98.  
113 See also Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais, [2010] EU:C:2010:143, paragraphs 28-30.  
114 Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115, paragraph 14.  
115 Ibid., paragraph 15; see also C. Barnard (2013), op. cit., p. 254.  
116 Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115, paragraph 19.  
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2.1.5 Freedom of establishment 
A further internal market freedom, which specifically reflects the general 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, is the freedom of establishment. 
Article 49 TFEU states that “[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set out below, 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the 
territory of another Member State shall be prohibited […].” According to the same 
article, the freedom of establishment shall also include the right to take up and pursue 
activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings under the 
conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such 
establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.  
As in the case of the free movement of workers and the freedom to provide 
services, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality represents a 
conceptual basis for the freedom of establishment. Articles governing the freedom to 
provide services and the freedom of establishment have a parallel structure and use 
identical concepts, which leads to the conclusion that similar observations apply to these 
two provisions.117  What is more, the case law of the CJEU confirms the character of the 
freedom of establishment as a specific projection of the general principle of equal 
treatment between nationals of different Member States.118 
Pursuant to the settled case law of the CJEU, the provisions on the freedom of 
establishment have the horizontal direct effect and can therefore be relied upon by 
private entities. In Viking, the Court of Justice decided that Article 43 EC [today’s 
article 49 TFEU] “may be relied on by a private undertaking against a trade union or an 
association of trade unions.”119 In the light of the foregoing, athletes may analogically 
invoke Article 49 TFEU in a dispute against international sporting governing bodies. 
2.1.6 Competition law 
Regarding the provisions of the Treaties on competition law, the prohibition of 
cartels enshrined in Article 101 TFEU, the prohibition to abuse a dominant position 
                                                
117 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 19. 
118 Case C-2/74, Jean Reyners v. Belgian State, [1974] EU:C:1974:68.  
119 Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers' Federation and The Finnish Seamen's Union, 
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contained in Article 102 TFEU and, in some cases, the prohibition to grant illegal state 
aid provided for in Article 107 TFEU, are of particular relevance to sporting rules in 
general and rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams in particular. The 
connection between competition law and sport encompasses areas including agencies, 
doping, media rights, multiple ownership of clubs, ticketing, transfer rules, state aids or 
sporting goods.120 Following this reasoning, rules of international sporting governing 
bodies governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams would fall under EU competition 
law.121 
What is more, the Court of Justice applied EU competition law, in particular the 
prohibition of cartels contained in Article 101 TFEU, to the doping control regulation 
adopted by the IOC in 2006 in its turning sports-related judgment in Meca-Medina & 
Majcen.122 In this judgment, the Court of Justice confirmed the application of EU 
competition law to sports and, as will be further illustrated in detail, broadened the 
group of sporting rules that now fall within the scope of EU law. The Court of Justice 
also slightly modified its approach in assessing the compliance of sporting rules with 
EU law shifting its focus on their context, objectives, inherence and proportionality.  
Having established that sporting rules may fall under various provisions of the 
Treaties concerning EU citizenship, free movement and competition law, I will now 
focus on the question whether sports rules in general, and those regarding sporting 
nationality in particular, constitute a restriction to athletes’ rights under EU law.    
2.2. Sports rules as a restriction to European Union law 
The notion of a limitation, an obstacle or a restriction to EU law is very broad 
and covers a wide group of measures including sporting rules. EU citizens dispose of a 
right, which they derive directly from the Treaties, to leave their Member State of origin 
to enter the territory of another Member State and reside there freely in order to pursue 
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an economic activity.123 EU law in general and Article 45 TFEU granting the freedom 
of movement for workers in particular preclude measures which might place nationals 
of a Member State at a disadvantage when they wish to pursue an economic activity in 
the territory of another Member State.124 Moreover, national provisions which 
precluding or deterring a national of a Member State from leaving his country of origin 
in order to exercise his right to freedom of movement therefore constitute restrictions on 
that freedom despite of applying without regard to the nationality of the workers 
concerned.125 
When it comes, for example, to the freedom to provide services, a restriction is 
deemed to be “any measure which, pursuant to any provision laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in a Member State, or as a result of the application of 
such a provision, or of administrative practices, prohibits or hinders the person 
providing services in his pursuit of an activity as a self-employed person by treating him 
differently from nationals of the State concerned.”126 In the light of the aforementioned, 
any rule or provision that precludes or at least deters EU citizens from exercising their 
rights to free movement constitutes an obstacle to EU law.127  
The same logic applies to sporting rules that constitute obstacles to EU law 
provided that they hinder athletes in exercising their rights under EU law. In Lehtonen, 
for example, the Court of Justice held that the basketball rule which allow a transfer of 
players to other clubs only during a limited period of “transfer windows” provides for a 
restriction to the free movement of workers.128 In a similar way, rules governing 
athletes’ eligibility in national teams limit athletes’ “opportunit[ies] to offer [their] 
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services to other national teams within the European Union.”129 Moreover, sporting 
nationality “restrict[s] the ability of teams to select and therefore to employ or engage 
the services of national of the other [EU] states who are not eligible with reference to 
the relevant criterion […],”130 in this respect namely nationality.131 Such restrictions 
must be justified in order to be compatible with EU law.  
In the following sections of this thesis, notably in the part dealing with sporting 
nationality rules which fall within the scope of EU law, constitute a restriction to EU 
law but may be justified and proportionate (4.2.), I will claim that rather than on 
existence of nonexistence of a restriction, it is more convenient to concentrate on a 
much broader and much more complex question of justification and proportionality. 
Before dealing with the concrete rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams, I 
will entertain in exploring the interconnected concepts of justification and 
proportionality in a broader sense regarding sporting rules in general.   
2.3. Justification and proportionality of sports rules as a restriction to 
European Union law 
In this subchapter, the question as to whether a sporting restriction to EU law in 
the fields of EU citizenship, free movement and competition law provisions can be 
justified is examined. Regarding the justifications, two important issues deserve closer 
attention. First, I will look at which types of justifications can be used. What is even 
more important, however, is the matter of which types of restrictive measures can be 
justified by which forms of justifications.132 There are two types of justifications: the 
Treaty derogations (2.3.1) and the public-interest requirements adjudicated by the CJEU 
by using the rule of reason doctrine (2.3.2).133 The principle of proportionality, which is 
crucial when it comes to justifications, is examined at the end of this chapter (2.3.3).  
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132 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
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2.3.1 Treaty derogations 
The Treaty of Lisbon provided the EU with an explicit contributory power 
regarding sport. Article 165 TFEU provides that the EU “shall contribute to the 
promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of 
sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.” 
On the other hand, this provision does not contain any derogations or justifications of 
restrictions to EU law, which must therefore be found elsewhere.  
The Treaties provide an exhaustive list of derogations regarding the specific 
rights enjoyed by migrant workers, the self-employed, providers or receivers of services 
and citizens. These express general derogations cover public policy, public security and 
public health.  The specific exemption concerning the employment in the public service 
must also be examined while discussing the elements narrowing the scope of EU law.134 
In this context, it should be envisaged that derogations contained in the Treaties are able 
to justify direct discrimination on grounds of nationality as well as indirectly 
discriminatory measures and indistinctly applicable measures.135 
The public policy exception deserves further exploration in the sporting context 
even though rules governing sporting nationality would probably not fall within its 
scope in the end. The Court of Justice acknowledged for the first time in Bosman that 
individuals, such as international sporting governing bodies, can rely on this 
exception.136 Following this claim, the question arises as to whether there is a sporting 
public policy in the EU. The authors of the Study on equal treatment of non-nationals in 
individuals sports competitions state that this policy could include for instance the 
inherent links between a club and the Member State or the sub-national region where it 
is located or the protection of competitive balance.137  
Be it as it may, the rules determining sporting nationality would probably not 
fall under the public policy exception since they are not set up following exclusively a 
personal conduct of athletes. Practices governing states’ actions regarding the use of the 
                                                
134 See inter alia C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., p. 496; S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., p. 338.  
135 See in general C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., p. 496-537.   
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public policy justification must apply mutatis mutandis to international sporting 
governing bodies for the sake of uniformity of EU law.138 The issue is that “measures 
taken on grounds of public policy must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of 
the individual concerned.”139 This leads to the conclusion that general rules, such as 
those governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams, would not be compatible with EU 
law in this regard, as they would not fall under the public policy exception.140 
Not even the public service exception under Article 45(4) TFEU regarding the 
freedom of movement for workers or the official authority exception under Article 51 
TFEU concerning the freedom to provide services seem to play any role regarding 
eligibility rules. I believe that these exceptions do not have much relevance in this 
context since it is “hard to sustain that representative national teams participate in the 
exercise of powers conferred by public law.”141 Exceptions to this claim can be found in 
the sports structures in some countries, for example in France, where national sporting 
governing bodies are equipped with certain authorities under public power.142 Yann 
Hafner, using an example of a rule of the Fédération Française de Football (FFF) 
obliging a player to join the national team when nominated and subjecting him to 
sanctions if he refuses to do so, claims that one cannot automatically rule out the public 
service justification set forth in Article 45(4) TFEU in the context of sports.143 The same 
reasoning applies equally to the official authority exception under Article 51 TFEU.  
If there are some doubts about the public service or the official authority 
exceptions, it seems that the remaining two exceptions, public security and public 
health, are clearly irrelevant in the sporting context since “they have nothing to do in se 
with” sports.144 Therefore, rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams cannot 
rely on the exemptions provided in the Treaties since the public policy and the public 
services or the official authority exemptions are probably not applicable while the 
public security and the public health exceptions are irrelevant.145   
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2.3.2 Rule of reason doctrine 
The Court of Justice has regularly held that an exemption for national teams is 
admissible under the so-called “rule of reason” doctrine despite of non-existence of any 
statutory exemption in respect of the rights of free movement of persons and to provide 
services or competition law concerning international sporting governing bodies’ rules 
governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams. The rule of reason doctrine covers the 
public interest requirements, also referred to as overriding requirements or objective 
justifications,146 which form an open-ended category of justifications recognized by the 
Court of Justice.147  
Regarding sporting rules, an interesting issue arises with the doctrinal 
controversy regarding the question of what types of restrictions can be defended by 
what types of justifications. Traditionally, the public interest requirements could only 
justify indirectly discriminatory and non-discriminatory rules as well as those rules 
preventing or impeding market access. However, Barnard claims that, in more recent 
but not consistent case law of the CJEU, there are signs that these types of justifications 
can also be used to defend directly discriminatory measures.148 If so, the introduction of 
the specific public interest requirement in the field of sport based on “respect for 
representation of culture and national identity through sports” could be considered.149  
Article 165 TFEU providing that “[t]he Union shall contribute to the promotion 
of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its 
structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function” might 
play a role in this respect. The EU would recognize the important role of nationality in 
sports thus contributing to the further eradication of all negative forms of 
discrimination.150 However, it is not clear whether the CJEU would be willing to adopt 
such an approach referring to the inconsistencies in its case-law on this question.  
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In sports-related issues, the CJEU has already accepted as legitimate objectives, 
for example, the need to ensure the training and development of young players, the need 
to maintain a certain sporting equilibrium between clubs and the need to preserve 
regularity of a sporting competition.151 These legitimate objectives are elaborated upon 
in detail in Chapter 3, which presents the CJEU’s sports-related judgments. Before 
assessing the concrete case law, I will briefly address the principle of proportionality, 
which is one of the most important principles of EU law.  
2.3.3 The principle of proportionality 
A contested measure must ultimately comply with the principle of 
proportionality in order to be justified. Essentially, the principle of proportionality 
requires that the measures must be “suitable for securing the attainment of the 
objectives which they pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it.”152 In practice, the CJEU first verifies whether the means chosen to achieve the 
end are appropriate. Afterwards, it considers whether it is not possible to conceive an 
alternative measure that is capable of producing the same result but is less restrictive 
upon the freedom of movement under the given circumstances.153 In general, the test of 
proportionality consists of a balancing exercise between the aims pursued by the 
national measure and its restrictive effects on the exercise of the right at stake.154  
The final word of the CJEU concerning any claimed justification also depends 
upon the level of scrutiny that it is willing to exert when assessing the respect for the 
principle of proportionality. The CJEU’s case-by-case analysis and the level of scrutiny 
that the CJEU applies are two important issues regarding the application of the 
proportionality principle. The judgment in Olympique Lyonnais represents a good 
example of the CJEU’s strict approach to the principle of proportionality. In this case, 
the Court of Justice recognized the legitimate objective of the education and training of 
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young players, but subsequently ruled that where the value of damages exceeded the 
costs of training, these damages would not meet the requirements of the principle of 
proportionality.155 On the other hand, sport belongs, in general, amongst those sectors 
where the CJEU grants respective authorities with a significant margin of appreciation. 
This rule will be further illustrated on the CJEU’s case-law regarding sporting rules.   
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3. Sports rules in the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union 
 This chapter discusses the case law of the CJEU regarding discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and other restrictions on athletes’ rights under EU law in the 
context of sport, with a particular attention paid to rules concerning national teams. 
First, the pre-2006 case law of the CJEU, which has helped to establish rules regarding 
national teams, and in which circumstances they may be excepted from the material 
scope of EU law under the “rule of reason” doctrine referring to their purely sporting 
nature is explored (3.1.). In 2006, however, the Court of Justice’s judgment Meca-
Medina & Majcen established a new test of the compliance of sporting rules, including 
those governing the composition of national teams, with EU law focusing rather on their 
context, objectives, inherence and proportionality (3.2.).     
3.1. Before Meca-Medina & Majcen: national teams exception 
The Court of Justice articulated the existence of an exemption for national teams 
for the first time in 1974 in Walrave where a rule of the International Cycling Union 
(UCI) requiring pacemakers to be of the same nationality as competitors was at stake.156 
The Court of Justice decided that sport falls within the scope of EU law in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity.157 Regarding national teams, however, Advocate 
General Warner invited the Court of Justice to rule that “rules of organisations 
concerned with sport that are designed to secure that a national team shall consist only 
of nationals of the country that that team is intended to represent” are not incompatible 
with EU law.158 The Court of Justice, seemingly following the Advocate General’s 
opinion, held that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality “does not 
affect the composition of sports teams, in particular national teams, the formation of 
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which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such has nothing to do with 
economic activity.”159  
Apart from acknowledging the national teams exceptions, the judgment in 
Walrave is important also for it recognized the horizontal direct effect of the provisions 
concerning free movement or workers and services. The Court of Justice ruled that this 
prohibition of discrimination “does not only apply to the action of public authorities but 
extends likewise to rules of any other nature aimed in regulating in a collective manner 
gainful employment and the provision of services.”160 The Court of Justice therefore 
enabled athletes to invoke such provisions also against international sporting governing 
bodies.161 
Two years later, the Court of Justice faced direct nationality discrimination in 
professional football for the first time in Donà. According to respective Italian rules, 
only those football players affiliated to the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) could 
play in professional matches, affiliation being open to Italian players only.162 As a 
general rule, the Court of Justice held that rules governing a sport must have complied 
with provisions on the free movement of persons and services in so far as the sport was 
practiced as economic activity.163 On the other hand, the Court of Justice accepted rules 
excluding “foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are 
not of an economic nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such 
matches and are thus of sporting interest only such as, for example, matches between 
national teams from different countries.”164 As in Walrave, the Court of Justice 
underlined that such rules must have remained limited to their proper objectives.165 In 
end, the Court of Justice found the Italian national measure incompatible with EU law 
unless it excludes foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons that 
are of sporting interest only.166  
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The judgment in Donà led to a gentlemen’s agreement between the European 
Commission and the UEFA under which national associations had to allow every first 
division team to field at least three foreign players and two players who have played in 
the country for an interrupted period of five years. This rule became known as the so-
called “3+2” rule.167 It is interesting that it was just this rule approved by the European 
Commission, alongside transfer fees between clubs, that was challenged by the Court of 
Justice in its probably most famous sports-related judgment to this day Bosman.168 
In Bosman, the Court of Justice kicked off by stating that “rules or practices 
justified on non-economic grounds which relate to the particular nature and context of 
certain matches” could be exempt from the scope of the Treaties, when they remain 
limited to their “proper objective”.169 However, the Court of Justice added that this fact 
cannot “be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the scope of the 
Treaty.”170 In this particular case, the Court of Justice ruled that nationality clauses were 
not limited to their proper objective since they did not concern specific matches 
between teams representing their countries but applied to all official matches between 
clubs and thus to the essence of the activity of professional players.171  
The Court of Justice confirmed the horizontal direct effect of Article 45 TFEU 
arguing that the principle of non-discrimination applied to clauses contained in the 
regulations of sporting associations that restricted the rights of players to take in part in 
football matches. The Court of Justice said that if EU law did not apply to this situation, 
Article 45 TFEU would be “deprived of its practical effect and the fundamental right of 
free access to employment which the Treaty confers individually on each worker in the 
[EU] rendered nugatory.”172 Having decided that these rules fell within the scope of the 
Treaty, the Court of Justice shifted to whether this restriction to the freedom of 
movement for workers could be justified.173 
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The Court of Justice swiftly answered the question in the negative. Regarding 
the reasons that could possibly justify discrimination on grounds of nationality, the 
authors of the Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports 
competitions submitted that the Court of Justice seemed to consider other reasons than 
public policy, public health and public security enshrined in Article 45(3) TFEU. They 
claimed that the Court of Justice was prepared to take into consideration the inherent 
nature of a club’s links with the Member State in which it plays or its subnational 
region.174 The Court of Justice, however, rejected this because such a link did not in fact 
exist.175 The Court of Justice accepted as a legitimate reason the need to protect 
competitive balance between clubs, but in end, the rule was disproportionate since it 
was not necessary for reaching this objective.176   
Regarding the second contested rule in Bosman, notably transfer fees between 
clubs, the Court of Justice went beyond the discrimination model and focused rather on 
the concept of market access. According to the Court of Justice, these rules were not 
discriminatory since they applied equally to nationals of different Member States.177 
Nevertheless, the Court held that since the transfer rules “directly affect players’ access 
to the employment market in other Member States”, they were capable of impeding the 
freedoms of movement for workers and as such breached Article 45 TFEU.178 Finally, 
the transfer rules did not pass the justification phase and the Court of Justice held them 
incompatible with EU law.179 
The Bosman ruling has had great influence on international sporting governing 
bodies and their regulatory autonomy. In this respect, Stefaan Van den Bogaert notes 
that, as a result of the judgment, “[t]he sporting associations had no option but to adapt 
to the new reality Bosman created: athletes have rights under EU law, and they can have 
them enforced before the ordinary courts.”180 He further adds that sports organizations 
have definitely and irrevocably lost their aura of immunity under EU law. Sport remains 
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primarily an affair of the sporting associations, but their regulatory autonomy is 
conditional, for due account must be taken of the requirements of EU law.”181  
In 2000, the Court of Justice dealt with rules regarding the limit on the number 
of athletes from every national judo federation allowed to participate in each 
international tournament. Christelle Deliège argued that, as a judoka, she was engaged 
in an economic activity and that these rules restricted her freedom to provide services. 
The Court of Justice found once again that “the Treaty provisions concerning freedom 
of movement for persons do not prevent the adoption of rules or practices excluding 
foreign players from certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic nature, 
which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of 
sporting interest only, such as, for example, matches between national teams from 
different countries.”182 Recalling its previous sports-related case law, the Court of 
Justice nevertheless stressed that such a restriction on the scope of the provisions in 
question “must remain limited to its proper objective and cannot be relied upon to 
exclude the whole of a sporting activity.”183 Finally, the Court of Justice decided that 
the contested regulation did not in itself breach the freedom to provide services.184 
Only two days later, the Court of Justice reached a similar conclusion in 
Lehtonen. In this case, the rules of a Belgian basketball association prohibited a 
basketball club from fielding in national championship matches players from other 
Member States who had been transferred outside of mandated “transfer windows”.185 
The Court of Justice decided that these rules restricted the freedom of movement of 
players and therefore constituted an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers.186 In 
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183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., paragraph 69; on the reasoning and the implications of the judgment see also S.C.G. Van den 
Bogaert, “The European Court of Justice on the Tatami: Ippon, Waza-Ari or Koka?”, (2000) European 
Law Review 25, pp. 554-563. 
185 The transfer window is the period during the year in which a football club can transfer players from 
other countries into their playing staff. 
186 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] EU:C:2000:201, paragraph 49.  
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the end, the Court of Justice left it to the national court to consider the extent to which 
objective reasons, concerning only sport as such, justify such treatment.187 
 In Kolpak, Simutenkov and Kahveci, the Court of Justice was invited to consider 
discrimination against non-EU nationals who were protected by the association 
agreement clauses analogous to the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens. In these 
particular cases, the Court of Justice concluded that the reasons put forward by 
international sporting governing bodies to justify such discrimination went beyond the 
Walrave purely sporting exception. The reason was that the clauses did not concern 
specific matches between teams representing their countries but applied to all official 
matches between clubs and thus to the essence of the activity of professional players.188 
 In the light of the foregoing, it is quite difficult to determine the exact approach 
of the Court of Justice towards national teams. According to Yann Hafner, these 
problems are notably caused by the differences in the wording of the clauses regarding 
the exemption of national teams from the scope of EU law.189 In the first place, the 
Court of Justice seemed to uphold the claim that national teams fell outside the scope of 
EU law.190 However, the Court of Justice took a more restrictive attitude in Donà when 
it held that “the rule might be limited not to the composition [of national] teams as such, 
but merely the exclusion of [foreign] players from certain matches.”191 Another change 
of direction came with Bosman where the Court of Justice ruled that the “whole of a 
sporting activity” could no longer be excluded from the scope of EU law.192 In this 
respect, Richard Parrish and Samuli Miettinen conclude that eligibility rules fall within 
the scope of EU law and must therefore be justified in order to survive the CJEU’s 
scrutiny.193 I submit that the Court of Justice made another step on this way towards the 
capture of sporting rules into the EU net in 2006 in Meca-Medina & Majcen.  
                                                
187 Ibid., paragraph 59; see also C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., p. 256. 
188 Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund, [2003] EU:C:2003:255, paragraph 54; see also Case C-
265/03, Simutenkov, [2005] EU:C:2005:213, paragraphs 38-39 and Case C-152/08, Real Sociedad de 
Fútbol and Kahveci, [2008] EU:C:2008:450, paragraphs 31-32.  
189 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., p. 224. 
190 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., p. 340.  
191 R. Parrish, S. Miettinen, The Sporting Exception in European Union Law, (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2008), 
p. 84.  
192 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 76.  
193 R. Parrish, S. Miettinen (2008): op. cit., p. 88.  
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3.2. After Meca-Medina & Majcen: context, objectives, inherence and 
proportionality 
 In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice put an end to the controversy as 
to whether purely sporting rules fall within the scope of EU law by answering the 
question in the affirmative. The case concerned two professional long-distance 
swimmers who were banned for two years for taking a prohibited substance 
Nandrolone. They complained to the European Commission claiming that the anti-
doping rules at stake infringed their economic freedoms under Article 56 TFEU on the 
free movement of services and Articles 101 and 102 TFEU regarding competition law. 
The European Commission, however, rejected their complaints.194 The swimmers’ 
appeal to the General Court for the European Commission’s decision to be annulled was 
dismissed195 so they appealed to the Court of Justice.196 
 While the General Court and Advocate General Léger, adopted a generous 
approach towards the regulatory autonomy of international sporting governing bodies, 
once again making reference to the purely sporting nature of their rules exempting them 
from the scope of EU law,197 the Court of Justice took a stricter line. It began by 
restating its traditional phrase that “sport is subject to Community law in so far as it 
constitutes an economic activity.”198 However, and this is where the judgment’s added 
value comes, the Court specified that that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in 
nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person 
engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down.”199 
From that point on, even rules of purely sporting interest, including those governing 
athletes’ eligibility in national teams, fall within the scope of EU law, whether or not 
they have economic impact. 
                                                
194 Case COMP/38158, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. International Olympic Committee [1 August 2002].  
195 Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2004] EU:T:2004:282. 
196 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492.  
197 Case T-313/02, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2004] EU:T:2004:282, paragraphs 68; 
Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, opinion of the 
Advocate General Philippe Léger, paragraphs 20, 29.  
198 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 22.  
199 Ibid., paragraph 27; see also S. Weatherill, “On Overlapping Legal Orders: What is the ‘Purely 
Sporting’ Rule?” in S. Weatherill, European Sports Law - Collected Papers, 2nd ed. (2014, T.M.C. Asser 
Press), pp. 401-424. 
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 Once the sporting rules are subject to EU law, they must comply with all the 
obligations that result from the various provisions of the Treaty. The Court of Justice 
specified in Meca-Medina & Majcen that “the rules which govern [sporting] activity 
must satisfy the requirements of those provisions, which, in particular, seek to ensure 
freedom of movement for workers, freedom of establishment, freedom to provide 
services, or competition.”200 Therefore, even though this particular case concerned the 
compliance of anti-doping regulations with EU competition law, its outcomes can be 
applied equally to other branches of EU law, notably the free movement provisions.  
Having seen that these rules are subject to EU law, the crucial question then 
shifts to whether they are in compliance with the respective provisions of the EU legal 
order. The Court recognized in Meca-Medina & Majcen that the contested anti-doping 
regulations restrict the athletes’ freedom of action thus limiting their rights under EU 
law.201 More particularly, the threshold of Nandrolone, which, when exceeded, 
constitutes a violation of the anti-doping regulation, imposes a restriction on 
professional sportsmen.202 It will further be argued that sporting rules in general, and 
those governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams in particular, constitute a 
limitation on athletes’ rights under EU law and must therefore be justified in order to 
order to ensure compliance with the CJEU’s approach.  
Regarding the question of justification, the Court of Justice started by stating 
that the “the compatibility of rules with the [EU] rules on competition cannot be 
assessed in the abstract.”203 The Court continued, while applying general principles set 
out in Wouters204, that “account must first of all be taken of the overall context in which 
the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects and, 
more specifically, of its objectives.”205 Consequently, “[i]t has […] to be considered 
whether the consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of 
those objectives […] and are proportionate to them.”206 Even though the two long-
distance swimmers lost their case in the end, Meca-Medina & Majcen entered history as 
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a case in which the Court of Justice broadened the group of sporting rules being subject 
to EU law and extracted four crucial elements that need to be taken into consideration 
when assessing the compliance of these rules with EU law – context, objectives, 
inherence and proportionality.  
It is true that the Court of Justice does not always uses the test imposed in Meca-
Medina & Majcen in its more recent sports-related cases, as for example in Olympique 
Lyonnais. The case concerned a young football player, Mr Bernard, who refused the 
offer of a professional contract made by his original club Olympique Lyonnais and 
rather concluded a contract with the English club Newcastle United FC. Pursuant to the 
French Charter for “joueurs espoirs”, he should have however signed his first 
professional contract, at the end of his training, with the club which had trained him, in 
this case Olympique Lyonnais. This club therefore sought an award of damages against 
Mr Bernard and Newcastle United FC equivalent to the remuneration which this player 
would have received over one year if he had signed the contract proposed to him by the 
club.207  
During the examination of questions for preliminary ruling referred by the 
French Court of Cassation, the Court of Justice first found that the obligation imposed 
by the Charter on the “joueur espoir” to conclude his first professional contract with the 
club that has trained him is a restriction on freedom of movement for workers.208 The 
Court of Justice nevertheless noted that such a restriction could be justified by the 
objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players, provided that it 
is actually capable of attaining that objective and is proportionate.209 In the end, 
however, the Court of Justice held that the rules at issue, which provide for the payment 
of damages which are calculated not in relation to the training costs incurred by the 
club, but in relation to the total loss suffered by the club, go beyond what is necessary to 
encourage the recruitment and training of young players and cannot therefore be 
justified.210 In this judgment, the Court of Justice therefore followed the classical three 
steps test – scope of EU law, existence of restriction and finally justification and 
proportionality.  
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It is submitted that the elements given by the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina & 
Majcen can be generally used to test the compliance of any sporting rules with EU law. 
The ground-breaking claim broadening the group of sporting rules falling within the 
scope of EU law211 and the general nature of the elements of justification extracted by 
the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina & Majcen leads me to such a conclusion. This is 
why I further proceed from the principles set out primarily in this judgment, taking into 
account also other decisions regarding internal market in general and sport in particular, 
when assessing the compliance of the concrete rules governing athletes’ eligibility in 
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4. Sporting nationality in the light of European Union law 
 This chapter divides rules governing athletes’ eligibility in their national teams 
into three groups according to the future attitude of the CJEU to these rules, which 
might be expected towards the background of its current case law. This division reflects 
the practice of the CJEU in assessing the compliance of certain rules with EU law 
provisions in the field of the internal market. Under this test, the CJEU first looks at 
whether a rule falls within the scope of the concrete freedom. If the CJEU responds in 
the affirmative, it then considers whether this rule constitutes a restriction to the 
freedom. If so, the question of justification and proportionality is examined as a final 
step before deciding on potential compliance of the rule with EU law.212 The Court of 
Justice showed in Meca-Medina & Majcen that it is willing to apply the same test while 
assessing the compliance of sporting rules with EU law provisions concerning 
competition.213 
 Firstly, group of sporting rules which do not fall within the material scope of EU 
law and which thus escape the scrutiny of EU judicial authorities is presented (4.1.). 
Secondly, rules governing athletes’ eligibility in their national teams, which fall within 
the scope of EU law, constitute a restriction to athletes’ rights under EU law but may be 
justified and proportionate, are discussed (4.2.). Finally, athletes’ eligibility rules that 
constitute an unjustifiable and disproportionate restriction to athletes’ rights under EU 
law and are thus incompatible with EU law are dealt with (4.3.). 
4.1. Sporting rules that fall outside the scope of European Union law 
The first group contains sporting rules that do not fall under the scope of EU 
law. Regarding these rules, international sporting governing bodies are free to establish 
respective criteria, at least from EU law perspective. The authors of the Study on the 
equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions claim that only those 
sporting rules having “no or a merely marginal or in any event clearly subordinate or 
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secondary economic impact or effect” are likely to fall under the purely sporting rules 
exception after Meca-Medina & Majcen.214 The category of sporting rules called “rules 
of the game” is a good example of rules that can still be regarded as purely sporting and 
thus falling outside the scope of EU law.215 It is difficult to imagine a rule governing 
swimmers’ turnover position during a medley competition216 or a rule enumerating fouls 
for which a yellow card is awarded in football matches to have such a strong economic 
impact or effect to fall under the decision-making scrutiny of EU judicial authorities. 
Sports federations and their bodies are the most competent in establishing technical 
rules determining form of a game or a competition and should keep their regulatory 
autonomy when setting these rules up.217   
It is submitted, however, that basically all rules governing athletes’ eligibility in 
their national teams have an economic impact, are not of a purely sporting nature 
anymore and thus fall within the scope of EU law. J. Paul McCutcheon submits that 
“[i]n some circumstances money is the predominant consideration underlying national 
representation especially where international fees represent the bulk of an athletes’ 
income.”218 Moreover, eligibility rules often determine “the conditions under which 
athletes are permitted to pursue their livelihoods.”219 In this respect, Stefaan Van den 
Bogaert calls for a better legal explanation for the Court of Justice’s receptiveness in the 
context of sporting rules governing matches between national teams.220 Since in 
practice, purely sporting and economic elements of sporting rules are hardly 
differentiable to automatically conclude on the inapplicability of EU law to these rules, 
                                                
214 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 228.  
215 Ibid.: 228. 
216 The US swimmer Ryan Lochte might not have the same opinion. In the 200 meters individual medley 
final at the 2015 World Aquatics Championships in Kazan, Russia, he used a new turn technique when he 
pushed off on his back and kicked underwater for ten meters. He then surfaced and swam what is 
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back to start the freestyle leg. Lochte was finally not disqualified and therefore won his fourth-straight 
World title in this discipline. Fédération internationale de natation (FINA) later made this new turn illegal 
in individual medley races. If Lochte were disqualified, he would be also deprived of the gold medal and 
related prize money and the sporting rule in questions would have an economic impact on him (“FINA 
Officially Makes “Ryan Lochte Turn” Illegal In IM Races”, Swimming World, 8 September 2015, 
retrieved 10 April 2016).   
217 J. Exner (2013): op. cit., p.1039.  
218 J. P. McCutcheon (2001): op. cit., p. 123.  
219 Ibid., p. 133.  
220 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., p. 455.  
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it is in my opinion more suitable to take the purely sporting nature of a rule into 
consideration when justifying a potential restriction to EU law rather than to 
automatically exclude the rule from the material scope of EU law. 
The Court of Justice seemingly reflected today’s economic reality of 
international competitions in its Meca-Medina & Majcen judgment when it partially 
overruled its case law on the application of EU law to sporting rules and practically 
dismantled the purely sporting rules exception.221 In this ground-breaking judgment, the 
Court of Justice decided that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does 
not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the 
activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down.”222 Therefore, the 
Court of Justice broadened the group of sporting rules which are subject to EU law 
scrutiny. 
The borderline between the absolute regulatory autonomy of international 
sporting governing bodies and situations in which they must reflect EU law 
requirements can be mutatis mutandis drawn by using the analogy of EU citizenship. In 
Rottmann, the Court of Justice hold that, even though Member States have the exclusive 
competence to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality,223 the 
national rules concerned must have due regard to EU law in situations falling within its 
material scope.224 In the same way, it is primarily for each international sporting 
governing body to set up rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams. On the 
other hand, since their rules have an economic impact or effect and influence rights that 
athletes derive from EU law, these rules fall within the scope of EU law and 
international sports federation must have due regard to EU law.  
As will be further discussed, the purely sporting nature of sporting nationality 
rules should be reflected in the subsequent phase of the CJEU’s test of compatibility of 
certain rule with EU law when the CJEU justifies a restriction to respective EU law 
                                                
221 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., 232. 
222 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 27.  
223 Case C-135/08, Rottmann, [2010] EU:C:2010:104, paragraph 39.  
224 Ibid., paragraph 41. In the paragraph 42 of this judgment, the Court of Justice rules that: “It is clear 
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decision withdrawing his naturalisation, adopted by the authorities of one Member State, and placing him, 
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by reason of its nature and its consequences, within the ambit of European Union law. 
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provisions. The Court of Justice itself ruled that, since it is difficult to severe the 
economic aspects from the sporting aspects of a sport, “the provisions of [EU law] 
concerning freedoms of movement for persons and freedom to provide services do not 
preclude rules or practices justified on non-economic grounds which relate to the 
particular nature and context of certain sporting events”.225 Such a restriction on the 
scope of the Treaty provisions must however remain limited to its proper objective, and 
cannot therefore be relied upon to exclude the whole of a sporting activity from the 
scope of the Treaty.226 
4.2. Sporting nationality rules which fall within the scope of European 
Union law, constitute a restriction to European Union law but may be 
justified and proportionate 
A second group of sporting rules contains rules governing athletes’ eligibility in 
their national teams, which fall within the scope of EU law, constitute a restriction to 
EU law provisions regarding the prohibition of discrimination in the fields of EU 
citizenship, free movement rules and competition, but may be eventually justified. 
Rules governing the election of sporting nationality and waiting periods are presented as 
examples of rules falling into this group.  
 The concept of a restriction or an obstacle to EU law is very broad. Pursuant to 
internal market freedoms, EU citizens have in particular the right that they derive 
directly from the Treaties, to leave their Member State of origin to enter the territory of 
another Member State and reside there freely in order to pursue an economic activity.227 
Therefore, any rule or provision that precludes or at least deters an EU citizen from 
exercising his right to free movement constitutes an obstacle to EU law.228  
                                                
225 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, paragraph 26; 
see also Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115, paragraphs 14 and 15.  
226 See, inter alia, Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. 
Bosman and Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, paragraph 76; see also Study on the equal treatment of non-
nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European Commission, 2010): 227. 
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228 On derogations, limitations, conditions and justifications of free movement of persons, see, in general 
C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., p. 496-537.  
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Selection rules or anti-doping regulation are examples of sporting rules setting 
an obstacle to athletes’ rights under EU law that can be found in the case law of the 
Court of Justice. In Deliège, despite of finally concluding on the compliance of the 
contested selection rules with EU law for their inherence in the conduct of an 
international high-level sports event, the Court of Justice nevertheless stated that these 
rules “inevitably have the effect of limiting the number of participants in a 
tournament.”229 In Meca-Medina & Majcen, the Court of Justice did not declare the 
contested anti-doping rules contrary to EU competition law, but it still recognized on 
several places in the judgment that these rules had ancillary effects that restricted 
competition.230 
It is argued that, when it comes to limitations of athletes’ actions, the questions 
of inherence, objectives and context of sporting rules, as well as their proportionality 
and other criteria set out by the Court of Justice in Wouters231, should rather be 
examined as a matter of justification of these limitations rather than a question of 
existence of such a restriction, no matter how small the restriction is. At this point, I do 
not agree with the findings of the authors of the Study on the equal treatment of non-
nationals in individual sports competitions who see this questions rather as the phase of 
the test during which the CJEU would examine whether a restriction to EU law exists or 
not.232 
I believe that it is more convenient to concentrate rather on a much broader and 
much more complex question of justification of a restriction limiting athletes’ rights 
under EU law rather than on existence or nonexistence of the restriction. For the sake of 
legal certainty, I believe that the Court of Justice’s judgments’ structure should be a 
little clearer in the way it expresses the shape of the three steps test (scope, restriction, 
justification) in order to prevent ambiguity in sorting individual criteria into one of the 
test’s categories. From my point of view, it is nowadays very difficult or rather 
practically impossible to imagine a rule governing sporting nationality that does not in 
any way restrict an athlete – EU citizen’s right under EU law to run his or her business 
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freely in a Member State different from the one of her/his origin. I will further work 
with these rules focusing on their justification and proportionality.  
I advocate the approach of focusing on justification and proportionality rather 
than on the question of factual existence or nonexistence of a restriction to EU law 
despite of the decreased level of legal certainty, which is necessarily connected to this 
attitude. I agree that the assumption, according to which any rule or provision that 
precludes or at least deters an EU citizen from exercising his rights under EU law 
constitutes a restriction, practically dismisses measures that are not perceived as a 
restriction to EU law. On the other hand, the sports-related judgments of the CJEU 
dedicate far more arguments and paragraphs to the instructions how to justify a 
restriction compared to the space devoted to the question of existence or non-existence 
of a restriction. While the CJEU often only briefly discusses the character of a 
restriction in not many paragraphs, it often dedicates a majority of its judgment to the 
questions of justifications and proportionality.233 Therefore, legal certainty of 
international sporting governing bodies contrarily increases in this respect since these 
bodies have much more detailed direction how to set their rules in order to successfully 
pass the final phase of the three steps test.    
At this point, I would also like to correct my previous opinion regarding the 
division of rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams from the EU law point 
of view. I originally, following the division proposed by the authors of the 
aforementioned Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports 
competitions234 or Yann Hafner235, also worked with a group of sporting rules that fall 
within the scope of EU law but do not constitute a restriction to athletes’ rights under 
EU law and I placed rules excluding foreign nationals of representative team rosters into 
                                                
233 See inter alia Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] EU:C:2000:201. First, the Court 
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that group.236 In this master’s thesis, I situate these rules into this second category since 
I believe that they constitute a restriction to EU law, which may be eventually justified.  
The manual to pass the CJEU’s test of the compliance of rules governing 
sporting nationality with EU law leans on three key words – objective, inherence and 
proportionality. In this regards, the Court of Justice provided a sporting community with 
a useful tool in its doping related judgment in Meca-Medina & Majcen while applying 
to the specific field of sport general principles set out in the Wouters case, which related 
to the regulation of the exercise of the profession of advocates in the Netherlands. 
Dealing with the contested anti-doping regulation in the light of EU competition law, 
the Court of Justice decided in Meca-Medina & Majcen that “account must first of all 
be taken of the overall context in which the decision of the association of undertakings 
was taken or produced its effects and more specifically, of its objectives.”237 According 
to the Court of Justice, the question then shifts to the evaluation “whether the 
consequential effects restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those 
objectives and are proportionate to them.”238 When assessing these criteria in the field 
of sporting rules, the Court of Justice’s task is to balance individual interests of athletes 
with the general interest protected by international sporting governing bodies.239 
In this respect, I will further follow and discuss in detail two rules governing 
sporting nationality proposed by Yann Hafner, which deserve further attention as to 
their compliance with the Wouters criteria: rules governing the election of sporting 
nationality (4.2.1) and waiting periods (4.2.2).240 
4.2.1 Rules governing the election of sporting nationality 
According to rules that govern the election of sporting nationality, an athlete is 
no longer eligible to be selected by any national team once he was previously selected 
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by another national team.241 An example can be drawn from the aforementioned football 
player Adnan Januzaj who opted for Belgium and who thus can no longer play for other 
national teams at international level.242 The same ratio applies to the eligibility of 
athletes in the Olympic Games. The Olympic Charter provides that “[a] competitor who 
is a national of two or more countries at the same time may represent either one of 
them, as he may select.”243 Generally speaking, “[…] dual sporting nationality is not 
accepted”.244 Those athletes who possess dual nationality according to respective 
national laws must choose only one country that they wish to represent in international 
competitions.245 
An interesting case of the election of sporting nationality is presented in the 
Olympic Charter for the purpose of the Olympic Games aiming at the situation in which 
“[…] an associated State, province or overseas department, a country or colony acquires 
independence, […] a country becomes incorporated within another country by reason of 
a change of border, […] a country merges with another country, or […] a new [national 
Olympic committee] is recognised by the IOC […].”246 In such a case, an athlete may 
continue to represent the country to which he belongs or belonged. However, he may 
elect to represent his country or be entered in the Olympic Games by his new national 
Olympic committee if one exists. This particular choice may be made only once.247  
Even though rules governing the election of sporting nationality formally restrict 
EU citizens’ rights by preventing them from being eligible to represent more countries 
in one moment, they simultaneously seek a logic and legitimate objective of “the 
regularity and integrity of international competitions.”248 Rules governing the election 
of a single sporting nationality also seek to safeguard “the principle of continuity of 
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competitions and ability to compare the performance amongst competitors.249 
Furthermore, the CAS holds the opinion that athletes may have only one sporting 
nationality at a time and that the election of sporting nationality is a legitimate 
mechanism to prevent athletes having dual nationality to change their eligibility at their 
own convenience.250  
Rules that require an athlete to have a single sporting nationality at a time are, in 
my opinion, inherent to the proper conduct of international sporting competitions. 
Without these rules, international sport would lose its character, purpose and magic. 
Sport is not only about excellence and aiming high, but also about identity to a group or 
a society. Article 165 TFEU mentions “the specific nature of sport, its structures based 
on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.” Even the Court of Justice 
recognized “the considerable social importance of sporting activities.”251 As the 
Commissioner for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport Tibor Navracsics puts it: „Of 
course sport is about having fun, being healthy and feeling good about yourself. But it is 
also about something much bigger. Sport and physical activity bring people from 
different backgrounds together, helping to create friendships and building 
communities.”252  
The development of modern sporting practice has had influence even on the 
structuring of the idea of the nation, the most important of all communities.253 In this 
respect, sport can be seen as forming part of national identity of Member States. The 
European Commission acknowledged in the European Model of Sport that international 
competitions are a tradition in Europe since “[n]ational teams are seen as representing a 
nation.”254 The European Commission goes even further and reiterates that sport is one 
of the last national passions in Europe and that a psychological need exists to confront 
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each another. Sport is a way of doing this without bloodshed. International competitions 
are an opportunity for Member States to demonstrate their culture and tradition, thus 
safeguarding the cultural diversity, which is one of the characteristics of Europe.255  
The social importance of sport certainly applies to athletes who pursue the idea 
of fair-play together with their rivals and who feel united with their teammates under 
one national flag fighting for the glory of their countries. Moreover, sporting 
community also connects passionate fans and other people feeling national pride and 
cheering for their representative teams.256 It is clear that if an athlete could wear a 
national jersey of more national teams at a time, sport would lose a substantial part of its 
social importance. In the light of the foregoing, I conclude that the election of a single 
sporting nationality is inherent in international sports. Setting up a rule requiring from 
an athlete to be eligible to play at a time only for one national team is, in my opinion, 
logical and proportionate to its objectives since I cannot see any comparable measure 
that would achieve the set objectives with the same intensity and would be at the same 
time less restrictive to EU citizens’ rights. 
4.2.2 Waiting periods 
 Rules imposing waiting periods are another example of sporting nationality 
rules, which fall within the material scope of EU law, which ordinarily constitute a 
restriction to such provisions, but which may be eventually justified. Waiting periods 
(otherwise called also cooling-offs periods257, non-competition periods258 or periods of 
inactivity259) belong to the sporting rules that have not been scrutinized by the CJEU 
yet.260 
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Under waiting periods, an athlete who has represented one country in 
international competitions recognized by the relevant international federations, and who 
has changed his nationality or acquired a new nationality, may participate in 
international competitions to represent their new country provided that certain period of 
time has passed since the competitor last represented their former country. Waiting 
periods do not constitute a sanction and they only limit athletes in competing in 
international competitions. However, since “money is the predominant consideration 
underlying national representation especially where international fees represent the bulk 
of an athlete’s income”,261 waiting periods restrict an athlete’s rights under EU law by 
limiting the possibility to run their business in other Member States for some time. 
Rules governing waiting periods seek a legitimate objective and are inherent to 
the functioning of international sports scene. These rules prevent athletes from changing 
their eligibility in national teams at their own convenience. At the same time, they help 
to monitor athletes’ naturalisations.262  Equally, they prevent “muscle drain” from one 
country to another one.263 To sum it up, these rules protect the regularity and fairness of 
international competitions thus protecting their integrity.264 Clearly, if an athlete were 
allowed to compete one year for Germany, the following year for the Czech Republic 
and the third year for France, international competitions would certainly lose their 
integrity. In the light of the foregoing, the objectives protected by waiting periods seem 
legitimate and inherent to the proper conduct of international competitions.265 
The match for the compliance of rules imposing waiting periods with EU law 
must be decided through the test of proportionality. In this respect, I believe that the 
length of cooling-offs periods, as well as some related conditions, represents the crucial 
issue. In the following paragraphs, I will show that the relatively frequently used 
waiting periods of two or sometimes even three years, depending on related conditions, 
comply with the requirement of proportionality in respect to the legitimate objectives 
that they seek. On the other hand, I believe that cooling-offs periods of four or more 
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years go beyond what is necessary in order to protect the integrity of international 
competitions are thus void under EU law.  
Waiting periods, which differ from one sport to another, generally range from 
periods of one to four years.266 A general cooling-off period set for the Olympic Games 
is three years. In this regard, the Olympic Charter states that “[a] competitor who has 
represented one country in the Olympic Games, in continental or regional games or in 
world or regional championships recognised by the relevant [international federation], 
and who has changed his nationality or acquired a new nationality, may participate in 
the Olympic Games to represent his new country provided that at least three years have 
passed since the competitor last represented his former country.”267 With regard to the 
Olympic Games, a three year waiting period is also often confirmed in respective 
international federations’ regulation.268 
In this respect, Stefaan Van den Bogaert claims that “the relatively frequently 
used waiting period of three years appears to be excessive” compared to the duration of 
a sporting career.269 I believe, however, that the Olympic waiting period of three years 
is not in itself excessive. Summer and Winter Olympic are held at four year intervals 
and this rule therefore allows an athlete to participate in next Olympics provided that 
they change their sporting nationality within one year of the end of the previous Games. 
The real problem comes, in my opinion, with some international sports federations 
imposing cooling-off periods, which must be respected even with regard to the 
Olympics and amount therefore to another condition of Olympic eligibility.  
Regarding international sporting governing bodies, the International Ice Hockey 
Federation (IIHF) and the International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) represent 
examples of federations, which impose, in my opinion, an excessive and therefore 
disproportionate waiting periods. The IIHF Statutes and Bylaws allows a player who 
“has represented a country in any IIHF championship, or in the Olympic competition or 
in the qualification to these competitions […] to represent another country” under the 
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following cumulative conditions: a) he is a citizen of that country; b) he has an 
international transfer that was approved by the IIHF and dated at least four years before 
the start of the IIHF competition in which he wishes to participate; c) he has 
participated, on a consistent basis, for at least four consecutive years (1460 days) in the 
national competitions of his new country during which period he has neither transferred 
to another country nor played ice hockey for a team registered/located within any other 
country: and d) he has not played for his previous country in an IIHF competition either 
during this four year period or between completion of this four-year period and the start 
of the IIHF championship he wishes to compete.270  
Even though the aforementioned general Olympic period is set at three years, the 
combination with the IIHF regulations exclude an ice hockey player who has changed 
his sporting nationality from the whole Olympic cycle and he must therefore wait, in 
extreme cases, for eight years before he can represent his new country in the Olympics. 
What is more, the IIHF World Championships and other international competitions are 
held regularly with a maximum one-year period. In the light of the aforementioned, it 
seems to me unjust and disproportionate to prevent a player who has modified his 
sporting nationality from playing for his national team for four consecutive years.  
Eligibility rules in general and ineligibility periods in particular are imposed in 
order to ensure that athletes have “a genuine, close, credible and established national 
link with the country […] for which they have been selected.”271 However, taking into 
consideration the character of the Olympic as the top of athletes’ efforts, I agree with 
Yann Hafner that this long ban rather discourages players from modifying their 
eligibility rather than to confirm and strengthen the genuine link to their country of 
representation.272 
The ITTF amounts to another, in this case even more extreme example of an 
international federation the rules of which, in my opinion, breach EU law. General 
ineligibility period of three years273 is not as such disproportionate regarding the aim to 
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prevent players being only mercenaries without any genuine link with their country of 
representation. However, the ITTF imposes progressive waiting periods on younger 
athletes who wish to modify their sporting nationality. They are excluded from 
international competitions for the period of three, five or seven years depending on their 
age in the moment of their registration.274 The least serious three-years waiting period 
applies to players under the age of 15 at the moment of their registration.275 These 
players are therefore excluded from international competitions for three years in a 
period of their sporting growth, during which they often decide whether to practice table 
tennis at a top level in the future. I can imagine that such exclusion rather discourages 
them from playing table tennis than waiting for three years before they get another 
chance. Let’s imagine an example of a 14-year-old player who has already played for 
his former country in a regional championships and who has changed his nationality for 
genuine family reasons. It is neither fair nor reasonable to make him the subject of such 
a ban.  All these reasons lead me to the conclusion that in this particular case, even a 
three year waiting period is excessive. Five and seven year long cooling-off periods 
clearly go, in my opinion, beyond what is necessary to protect the proper conduct of 
international competitions.   
At this point, the question arises about the need to unify waiting periods 
throughout the sporting world in order to ensure compliance with law and prevent 
discrimination amongst athletes with different sporting nationalities practicing different 
sports. Diverse international sporting governing bodies have divergent attitudes 
eligibility rules that also include waiting periods.276 There is no unique duration of 
waiting periods imposed by the Olympic Movement on international federations with 
binding effect and even less there is no common level playing field among international 
sporting governing bodies. This implies that athletes having the same sporting 
nationality are subjects to different waiting periods depending on a sport they compete 
in.277  
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The basic discrimination assumption must be taken into account in the 
discussion about possible ways to deal with problems caused by different regulations 
imposed by different international sporting governing bodies. In this respect, 
“comparable situation must not be treated differently and […] different situations must 
not be treated in the same way.”278 In other words, to discriminate means to “make un 
unjust and prejudicial distinction in the treatment of different categories of people” on 
various grounds.279 All in all, prohibition of discrimination seeks to prevent acts or 
omissions in which one person is treated less favourably than another person in a 
comparable situation.280 It is difficult to think about a system that would meet in all of 
its aspects all requirements of the prohibition of discrimination. Therefore, even though 
the solutions proposed below are not ideal, it is in my opinion useful to address them in 
order to encourage a global discussion on this topic.  
I am of the opinion that unique and harmonized short waiting periods would be 
the best solution out of all options seeking to prevent problems caused by divergences 
between different international sporting governing bodies’ regulations regarding 
cooling-offs periods. I firstly thought about the possibility of a case-by-case assessment 
regarding the average length of an athlete’s career, which could be the decisive criteria 
to be assessed when an international sporting governing body imposes a waiting period. 
Athletes in different sports have careers of different duration. This solution would 
therefore allow to take into consideration the specificities and different characteristics of 
diverse sports. On the other hand, this proposal would once again treat athletes in 
different sports differently. Moreover, it would require each international federation to 
have well-founded and justified statistics taking into account wide and complex data in 
a particular sport.  
Since the system based on the average length of athletes’ career in different sport 
would still be discriminatory, technically very difficult to set up and since other 
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controversies could arise as to the methodology and form of statistics, unique waiting 
periods seem a more suitable, although not a perfect solution. Authors calling for 
harmonization of waiting periods281 argue that a short and mandatory waiting period 
would ensure greater consistency and subsequent equality of treatment among 
athletes.282 However, this equality would be only partial, since athletes in sports with a 
shorter average length of career, as for example gymnastics, would perceive unique 
waiting periods as unfair in comparison to athletes in other sports where athletes 
compete, on average, for a longer period of time.  
Moreover, it is nowadays hardly imaginable that international sporting 
governing bodies throughout the World would easily agree on one common period of 
ineligibility. Even though I actually perceive the “harmonised” option as slightly more 
suitable solution, it is incumbent upon international sporting governing bodies to gather 
together, for example at the occasion of the Olympics, to discuss this issue and to try to 
find a common position that would enable the sporting World to more easily face the 
challenged connected to the prohibition of discrimination. 
4.3. Sporting nationality rules that constitute an unjustifiable and 
disproportionate restriction to European Union law 
This last group of rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams contains 
those rules that are not compatible with EU since they fall within its scope and 
constitute a restriction that cannot be justified under EU law. Regarding sporting rules 
in general, the Bosman case is the most famous example of the Court of Justice’s 
condemnation of sporting regulations. In this judgment, the Court of Justice held the 
long-standing transfer rules and the “3+2” nationality clauses in professional football 
incompatible with EU law for violating the free movement for workers. Thanks to this 
decision, professional football players are entitled to move to another club after the 
expiry of the contract with their club of affiliation without any compensation being due 
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to the former club. Regarding the “3+2” nationality clauses in sport, they are no longer 
applicable to EU citizens.283 
An earthquake similar to the one that struck European football after the Bosman 
ruling might as well affect other sports since some international federations keep their 
rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams, which go beyond what is 
necessary for the proper conduct of a sport and are therefore non-compliant with EU 
law. Quotas of naturalized athletes (4.3.1) and rules absolutely preventing athletes from 
changing their sporting nationality (4.3.2) fall under this category of EU law breaching 
rules. Many authors throughout the World agree that these rules and related practices of 
international sporting governing bodies do not comply with EU law since they provide 
for an unjustifiable restriction to athletes’ rights under EU law.284  
4.3.1 Quotas of naturalized athletes 
Rules concerning quotas of naturalized athletes limit the number of players in 
national teams who have acquired legal nationality by naturalization and/or who have 
previously played for another national team. In general, sporting governing bodies that 
regulate team sports have a stricter approach to rules setting up quotas of naturalised 
athletes in comparison to individual sports.285 Yann Hafner submits that the difference 
in these approaches might be explained by a closer link of team sports to national 
sentiment. “This is observed by the playing of national anthems prior to 
competition.”286 In extremis, the decision of athletes to change their sporting nationality 
can be perceived as treason. Yann Hafner uses the example of the basketball player 
Becky Hammon who, originally from the United States of America, opted for Russian 
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nationality, and who represented her new country at the Beijing Olympics. Her conduct 
was criticized by American media and sports officials as traitorous.287 
Basketball and volleyball are two sports in which quotas of naturalized athletes 
are applied. The FIBA’s Internal Regulations provide that a national team participating 
in a competition recognized by the FIBA may have “only one player on its team who 
has acquired the legal nationality of that country by naturalization or by any other 
means after having reached the age of sixteen […].”288 In a similar way, the Sports 
Regulations of the International Volleyball Federation (FIVB) state that “[o]nly one 
player having previously played for another national team of the same age category can 
be part of a team, for a given event.”289 In this respect, quotas of naturalized athletes 
clearly restrict athletes’ rights under EU law.  
My argumentation further follows two lines. The first one considers whether the 
CJEU’s case law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of the time at which or the 
manner in which EU citizens acquired their nationality can be applied to rules 
governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams. The positive answer to this question, 
which requires legal and sporting nationality to overlap, would be fatal for rules 
imposing quotas of naturalized athletes. The second line of argumentation examines 
whether these sporting rules constituting restriction to athletes’ rights under EU law can 
be justified in the light of the elements of context, objectives, inherence and 
proportionality extracted by the Court of Justice in Meca-Medina & Majcen.  
Starting with the first line, it is useful to look at the findings of the Court of 
Justice’s judgment in Auer, which provides an interesting point of reflection regarding 
quotas of naturalized athletes. In Auer, the Court of Justice held that “[t]here is no 
provision of the Treaty which, within the field of application of the Treaty, makes it 
possible to treat nationals of a Member State differently according to the time at which 
or the manner in which they acquired the nationality of the state, as long as, at the time 
at which they rely on the benefit of the provision of community law, they possess the 
nationality of one of the Member State and that, in addition, the other conditions for the 
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application of the rule on which they rely are fulfilled.”290 It is likely that the CJEU 
holds quotas of naturalized athletes incompatible with EU law if it applies the criteria 
set out in Auer to them.291 The question is whether the concepts of legal and sporting 
nationality overlap.  
The CAS is of the opinion that legal nationality and sporting nationality 
constitute two different concepts.292 The majority of scholars, including for example 
Jean-Philippe Dubey293 or Stefaan Van den Bogaert294, advocate the same view.295 
According to the CAS, legal nationality represents “the personal status deriving from 
citizenship of one or more states”296 while sporting nationality is a “uniquely sporting 
concept, defining the eligibility rules of players with a view to their participation in 
international competitions.”297 Be it as it may, legal nationality or citizenship are used 
as the basic criteria of the constitution of sporting nationality in rules of many 
international sporting governing bodies, namely the FIBA and the FIVB.298 On the other 
hand Austrian and French courts refuse to accept the distinction between legal and 
sporting nationalities since they uphold athletes’ claims based on the overlap of these 
two concepts.299 I believe that if legal and sporting nationality overlap, as is the case of 
the FIBA and the FIVB, the Auer line of case-law is applicable to their rules governing 
athletes’ eligibility in national teams. If so, these regulations would need to survive the 
CJEU’s proportionality test, which, as will be further discussed, is hardly imaginable.  
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In the second line of my argumentation, I submit that even if the CJEU did not 
apply its findings from Auer to quotas of naturalized athletes, these rules would anyway 
not survive the CJEU’s test of the compliance with EU law having regard to their 
context, objectives, inherence and proportionality. I do not contest that these rules 
follow a legitimate objective. Through their application, international sporting 
governing bodies seek “the homogeneous nature, regularity and the interest of the 
international competitions they organise.”300 The goal of the aforementioned rules is to 
“prohibit on the one hand that certain States that wish to promote themselves on the 
international scene naturalise large numbers of athletes in order to achieve their desired 
recognition, and on the other hand, that athletes comporting themselves as mercenaries 
participate in international competitions representing countries with which they have no 
objective link.301  
Even though quotas of naturalized athletes might seek to protect the integrity of 
international competitions, these rules are in my opinion neither inherent in the proper 
conduct of international competitions nor necessary and proportionate. The 
aforementioned FIBA rule applies also “to any player having the right to acquire a 
second nationality at birth but who did not lay claim to this right until after having 
reached the age of sixteen.”302 However, it is possible that an athlete loses his previous 
legal nationality or changes it for another,303 for example in the case of marriage or 
naturalization. Nowadays, many States do not recognize double nationality. Therefore, 
these rules then exclude from all participation in international competitions the athlete 
who has changed his or her nationality.304 Moreover, Yann Hafner points out that this 
rule affects also, for example, a player who has never represented another country in 
international competitions.305 Even more curiously, this example can concern, for 
instance, a minor whose legal nationality changed as a consequence of the change of 
legal nationality of its parents.306 In the light of the foregoing, the FIBA’s regulation is 
unnecessary, since other measures less restrictive on players’ rights under EU law are 
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302 FIBA Internal Regulations (2014), Article 3.21.a. 
303 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., pp. 448. 
304 D. Oswald, Y. Hafner (2008): op. cit., p. 18.  
305 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., p. 236. 
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capable of achieving the same result.307 I have previously claimed that one could 
imagine a rule that would not restrict a player’s eligibility to play for his new national 
team when he had never before worn a jersey of his previous national team in 
international competitions.308  
Moreover, quotas of naturalized athletes lack proportionality stricto sensu. In 
this regard, I agree with Denis Oswald and Yann Hafner, who claim that it is 
unacceptable to  “differentiate and fix quotas for naturalised athletes already having 
participated for another national federation, whereas those who have never been 
selected a priori are not subject to the same restrictions.”309 These two authors further 
add that “this discrimination is all the more regrettable in so far as it does not allow the 
prohibition of abusive naturalisations from the sporting point of view - whether they 
result from the action of the State or the athlete.”310  
In the light of the above, I am of the opinion that neither the FIBA’s regulation 
allowing only one player on a national team who has acquired the legal nationality of 
that country by naturalization or by any other means after having reached the age of 
sixteen, nor the FIVB’s rule allowing only one player having previously played for 
another national team of the same age to be part of a team are proportionate. Therefore, 
the CJUE could potentially declare these rules incompatible with EU law.  
4.3.2 Rules preventing athletes from changing their sporting nationality 
Athletes change their legal and subsequently sporting nationality for various 
reasons by their own choice or as a result of circumstances independent of their will. 
The football players Adnan Januzaj and the Boateng brothers, whose stories opened this 
thesis, represent examples of athletes who could change or have changed sporting 
nationalities during their careers for genuine reasons. There are, of course, many more 
athletes who could undergo or have completed the modification of their eligibility. 
Some of them have done so as a consequence of events, which would not have always 
resulted from their voluntary choices, for example for family reasons or because of war. 
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Others have changed their sporting nationality simply because of the competition in 
their original national teams.  
From the EU law point of view, at least when it comes to the free-movement for 
workers, the reason that led an athlete to change his sporting nationality is irrelevant. 
There are opinions calling for a stricter approach of international sporting governing 
bodies towards those athletes who have changed their eligibility by their own choice 
driven by a sporting reason, for example because of the aforementioned competition in 
their former team, without any serious reasons of a personal nature.311 However, the 
Court of Justice has held on several occasions, for the first time in Levin and recently in 
L. N., that the freedom of movement for workers must not be “contingent on which 
objectives are being pursued by a national of a Member State in applying to enter the 
territory of a host Member State, provided that he pursues or wishes to pursue effective 
and genuine employment activities.”312 The Court of Justice further clarified that “the 
motives which may have prompted a worker of a Member State to seek employment in 
another Member State are of no account and must not be taken into consideration 
[…].”313 Therefore, EU authorities will not take into account the reason leading an 
athlete to change his sporting nationality. Be it as it may, athletes who want to change 
their eligibility for whatever reasons are sometimes prevented from doing so simply 
because the international body governing their sport forbids such a modification.    
International sporting governing bodies approach the question of parameters 
allowing athletes to change their eligibility in national teams in a different way 
depending on whether they govern an individual or a team sports. Sports federations 
regulating individual sports tend to permit athletes to change their sporting nationality. 
Contrarily, most team sports do not show much tolerance towards athletes wishing to 
change their eligibility in national teams. If these federations allow athletes to change 
their sporting nationality, they usually apply very strict rules including quotas of 
                                                
311 Gerhardt Bubník, an advocate and a leading Czech expert in the field of sports law, expressed this 
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naturalised athletes dealt with above or they completely forbid the modification of 
sporting nationality.314 
Basketball, football, table tennis or rugby are examples of sports in which 
players, under certain circumstances, are prevented from changing their eligibility in 
national teams. The FIBA completely denies athletes’ right to change their sporting 
nationality. Its Internal Regulations provide that “[a] player who has played in a main 
official competition of the FIBA after having reached his seventeenth birthday may not 
play for a national team of another country.”315  There are two minor exceptions to this 
prohibition. Apart from the age limit of seventeen years,316 the Secretary General of the 
FIBA may, in exceptional circumstances, authorize an a priori ineligible player to play 
for the national team of his country of origin if this is in the interest of the development 
of basketball in this country.317 Spiro aptly compares these no-transfer regimes to “the 
feudal perpetual allegiance premise to nationality under which birth nationality could 
never be severed.”318 In the light of the above, it is clear that the rule preventing athletes 
from changing their sporting nationality in basketball constitute a restriction on their 
rights under EU law.  
Coming from a basketball court to a football field, the FIFA Statutes: 
Regulations Governing the Application of the Statutes provide that “[…] any Player 
who has already participated in a match (either in full or in part) in an Official 
Competition of any category or any type of football for one Association may not play an 
international match for a representative team of another Association.”319 The exception 
allowing players to once change their sporting nationality is provided for in the rule 
8.1.: “If a Player has more than one nationality, or if a Player acquires a new nationality, 
or if a Player is eligible to play for several representative teams due to nationality, he 
may, only once, request to change the Association for which he is eligible to play 
international matches to the Association of another Country of which he holds 
                                                
314 Y. Hafner (2008): op. cit., p. 1.  
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nationality […].”320 This exception is, however, subject to at least one of the following 
conditions – the player “has not played a match (either in full or in part) in an Official 
Competition at “A” international level for his current Association, and at the time of his 
first full or partial appearance in an international match in an Official Competition for 
his current Association, he already had the nationality of the representative team for 
which he wishes to play” or “he is not permitted to play for his new Association in any 
competition in which he has already played for his previous Association.”321 In any 
case, these provisions limit players’ right to play for another Member State’s national 
team of their choice and as such, they provide for a restriction to their rights under EU 
law.  
The ITTF is another international sporting governing body that, in my opinion, 
violates EU with its regulations practically excluding sporting nationality modification. 
Table tennis is one of the sports where the modification of sporting nationality belongs 
to the biggest concerns. Yann Hafner points out that some national governments were 
expediting the naturalization process for promising athletes in order to get their services 
in the shortest time possible.322 As a reaction, the ITTF prevents athletes over the age of 
21 from participating in international competitions while representing a new 
association.323 Regarding athletes who have naturalized and have never represented any 
country in World events, this rule arises serious questions as to their validity under EU 
law since it clearly limits table tennis players – EU citizens – in exercising their 
rights.324  
Last but not least, World Rugby Regulations provide that “[a] Player who has 
played for the senior fifteen-a-side National Representative Team […] is not eligible to 
play for the senior fifteen-a-side National Representative Team […] of another 
Union.”325 This regulation applies equally to Rugby Sevens326 thanks to which rugby 
appears again in the Olympic program of the Games of the XXXI Olympiad in 2016 in 
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Rio de Janeiro after having absented from the games for 92 years.327 As in the case of 
basketball, football and table tennis, the rugby regulation clearly limits athletes’ rights 
under EU law.  
No matter how the integrity of international competitions may be secured by 
denying athletes’ right to change their sporting nationality, aforementioned prohibitions 
lack proportionality and are therefore potentially void under EU law. In November 
2005, a conference panel, including some of the leading experts in the field of sports 
law concluded that “one cannot totally preclude the right to change one’s sporting 
nationality and with it the possibility to represent a second country” since “many 
changes of nationality are legitimate and are imposed by circumstances and not all are 
the result of economic, or, occasionally, money-making considerations.”328 Participants 
in the aforementioned conference, including representatives of many sporting governing 
bodies, came to the conclusion that the prohibition was indeed illegal. In spite of this 
fact, many federations continue to apply these rules.329 
                                                
327 World Rugby Regulations (2016), Regulation 8, rule 8.6; „Golf & rugby voted into Olympics”, BBC 
Sport, 9 October 2009, retrieved 10 April 2016. 
328 D. Oswald (Ed.) (2004): op. cit., p. 201.  




In 2006, the Court of Justice switched the points and launched a new way of 
assessing the compliance of sporting rules with EU law. Starting from the first thematic 
judgment in Walrave in 1974, the Court of Justice had constantly applied to rules 
determining the composition of national teams the exception from the scope of EU law. 
It claimed that these rules, if limited to attain their proper objective, have only sporting 
interest without any economic impact or effect that would pull them into the 
competence of EU authorities. In the 2006 Meca-Medina & Majcen judgment, however, 
the Court of Justice decided that a purely sporting nature of a rule does not have the 
effect of removing from the scope of EU law the person engaging in the activity 
governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down. I have demonstrated that from 
that point on, sporting rules, including those regulating athletes’ eligibility in national 
teams, come under the scrutiny of EU judicial authorities, even though the CJEU has 
not ruled on these specific rules yet.   
In this master’s thesis, I have shown that a vast majority of sporting rules 
constitute a restriction to EU law since they limit athletes’ rights under respective 
provisions of the EU legal order and must therefore pass the justification phase in order 
to be held compatible with EU law. In this regard, the CJEU equipped international 
sporting governing bodies with a useful tool once again in Meca-Medina & Majcen, 
employing general principles set out in Wouters, when it extracted the elements to be 
taken into account. First, the overall context in which the rule was enacted or produced 
its effects must be taken into account with a particular attention to its objectives. 
Thereafter, the inherence of the rule to the proclaimed objectives must be examined and 
measured with the principle of proportionality in the end. I have demonstrated that the 
CJEU would consider the same criteria if a case regarding rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in national teams came to the court.  
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that some rules determining sporting 
nationality in their current state, notably certain waiting periods, quotas of naturalized 
athletes and rules prohibiting the change of sporting nationality, would probably not 
passed the CJEU’s test and would therefore be deemed void under EU law. In most 
cases, the context of rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams is not a 
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problem as such. Moreover, these rules usually seek a legitimate objective. However, 
they are often not inherent to their objectives and disproportionate since they go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve their goals. International sporting governing bodies should 
be more attentive to EU law since a potential ruling of the CJEU holding their rules 
incompatible with EU law could represent another Bosman judgment flipping the world 
organization of sport upside down. 
Academicians throughout the world are aware of issues arising in the 
intersection between rules governing athletes’ eligibility in national teams and EU law 
and propose possible solutions in this regard. At the 2009 Olympic congress held in 
Copenhagen, a renowned professor Denis Oswald suggested a creation of “Olympic 
nationality”. This new concept would be independent from legal nationality and would 
govern sporting nationality within the Olympic Movement.330 Yann Hafner submits that 
this motion would undermine legal challenges under EU law since it would fall within 
the scope of EU law but would not constitute a restriction.331 In the light of the findings 
of this master’s thesis, I am not sure about the non-restrictive nature of this measure, but 
this concept is definitely worth further discussion. 
 And what if sporting identity was connected not to a country, but rather to an 
international organization? Luc Desaunettes ponders in his work upon a concept that 
could, with a certain level of exaggeration, be called “the European Union sporting 
nationality”. He shows that sport has enabled the progressive structuring of a public 
European area and looks into some ideas that might, by using sport as a lever, lead to 
the development of a political sense of belonging to the EU. As examples of these ideas, 
he talks about the European anthem being played in conjunction with the national 
anthem when a European team is playing or a special prize for the European champions 
in the form of the possibility to wear a badge with the European colours on their 
jerseys.332 However might this concept go against the purely national attitudes of certain 
athletes and fans, I think that this idea also deserves further exploration. 
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Be it as it may, international sporting governing bodies should carefully think 
their moves over in the game of chess against EU law. They play with white pieces. 
Therefore, they have the right to make the first move. They must simultaneously pay 
attention to the moves of EU law, notably the case law of the CJEU, and adapt their 
style of playing to that of their opponent. They are free to establish respective criteria of 
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1. Mezinárodní sportovní organizace a jejich pravidla upravující 
příslušnost sportovců k národním týmům 
Mezinárodní sportovní organizace plní svoji roli ve světě sportu tím, že „spravují 
jeden nebo více sportů v celosvětovém měřítku a zaštiťují organizaci a správu takových 
sportů na národní úrovni.“333 Za tímto účelem přijímají tyto „mezinárodní nevládní 
organizace334 v rámci své regulační autonomie konkrétní pravidla stanovující kritéria 
příslušnosti sportovců v mezinárodních soutěžích. Stejné pravomoci mají i organizace 
zaštiťující neolympijské sporty. Tato pravidla jsou zakotvena v jejich zakládajících 
dokumentech či v jimi později přijatých předpisech.335 
Ve 20. století bylo výlučným kritériem určujícím příslušnost sportovců k jejich 
národním týmům jejich státní občanství, jehož charakteristickým prvkem je podle 
Mezinárodního soudního dvora „skutečné spojení“ mezi jednotlivcem a státem.336 
Ústavní soud ČR definoval státní občanství jako „časově trvalý, místně neomezený 
právní vztah fyzické osoby a státu, který je proti vůli fyzické osoby zpravidla 
nezrušitelný, na jehož základě vznikají jeho subjektům vzájemná práva a povinnosti, 
spočívající zejména v právu fyzické osoby na ochranu ze strany státu na jeho území i 
mimo ně, v právu pobytu na jeho území a v právu účasti na jeho správě veřejných 
záležitostí.“337 Především výrazné zvýšení přeshraniční mobility sportovců po celém 
světě však vedlo na začátku nového milénia přední světové odborníky na sportovní 
právo k tomu, aby s hlediskem státního občanství jako jediným kritériem pro určení 
sportovní příslušnosti polemizovali.338  
Sportovní organizace začaly základní kritérium státního občanství při stanovení 
příslušnosti sportovců k jejich národním týmům postupně měnit nebo doplňovat. Mnoho 
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mezinárodních sportovních organizací vložilo do svých regulí požadavky, které se týkají 
například místa narození či místa trvalého pobytu.339 Například mezinárodní ragbyový 
výbor ve svých pravidlech uvádí, že hráč může nastoupit pouze za národní tým země a) 
ve které se narodil, b) ve které se narodil jeden z jeho rodičů nebo prarodičů, nebo c) ve 
které pobýval v průběhu 36 měsíců předcházejících času zápasu.340 Občanství již nadále 
není jediným kritériem pro určení příslušnosti sportovce k jeho národnímu týmu, který 
je pro účely této práce pojímán ve vztahu k mezinárodním sportovním soutěžím.341  
Uvedená praxe mezinárodních sportovních organizací vytvořila „sportovní 
národnost“, kterou podle Arbitrážního soudu pro sport rozumíme „unikátní sportovní 
koncept definující pravidla sportovní příslušnosti jednotlivých hráčů z pohledu jejich 
účasti v mezinárodních soutěžích.“342 Ve stejném arbitrážním nálezu B. v. Mezinárodní 
basketbalová federace z roku 1993 Arbitrážní soud pro sport zároveň podotkl, že -  
v kontrastu ke sportovní národnosti - státní příslušnost „zahrnuje osobní status 
odvozený z občanství jednoho nebo více států“.343 Sportovní národnost není v každém 
případě nutně shodná s občanstvím či státní příslušností sportovce.  
Rozhodující panel, kromě odlišení zmíněných konceptů, definoval i jejich 
vzájemný vztah, když uvedl, že „sportovci se setkávají se dvěma odlišnými 
normativními řády, jedním vycházejícím z veřejného a druhým ze soukromého práva, 
které se vzájemně nepřekrývají a nejsou ve vzájemném konfliktu.“344 Může tedy dojít 
k situaci, kdy je sportovec dle příslušného právního řádu občanem jedné země, kterou 
však nesmí reprezentovat na mezinárodní scéně, a na druhé straně k situaci, kdy sice 
není občanem, ale smí i přesto závodit pod vlajkou daného státu.345 Arbitrážní soud dále 
doplnil, že výkon pravomocí mezinárodních sportovních organizací je omezen pouze 
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obecnými právními principy,346 čímž prakticky vyloučil aplikaci velké části dalších 
pramenů práva, například i práva Evropské unie (EU).347  
Mezinárodní sportovní organizace vytvářejí vlastní normativní řád „lex 
sportiva“348, který je nezávislý na právních řádech jednotlivých států až do chvíle 
případného střetu s nimi. Předpisy těchto organizací, které jsou součástí zmíněného 
konceptu, nezasahují do výlučné kompetence států určit práva a povinnosti, které je 
nutno splnit za účelem nabytí státního občanství. Praxe dokládá, že soudy obecně, 
především ty francouzské a rakouské, přiznávají autonomním sportovním pravidlům 
poměrně velkou váhu.349 Mezi tato pravidla patří například kvóty naturalizovaných 
sportovců, čekací lhůty i další kritéria, která musejí sportovci respektovat, aby mohli 
reprezentovat svou zemi na mezinárodní úrovni. 
Vzhledem k velkému počtu sportovních utkání, která se odehrávají mezi kluby 
z jednotlivých členských států Evropské unie či mezi jejich národními reprezentacemi, 
mají pravidla upravující sportovní národnost bezprostřední vliv na unijní právní 
prostředí. Institucí, která by měla hrát hlavní roli při určování vztahu sportovních 
pravidel a práva Evropské unie, je bezpochyby Soudní dvůr Evropské unie (SDEU)350 
jako vrcholný unijní soudní orgán. Zdá se však, že judikatura SDEU není v tomto 
specifickém případě doposud úplně jednotná ani jednoznačná.351 
Cílem této práce je vymezení vztahu pravidel upravujících příslušnost sportovců 
k jejich národním týmům, stanovených jednotlivými sportovními organizacemi, a práva 
EU. Otázkou, na niž tato práce hledá odpověď, je, zda jsou tato pravidla v souladu 
s unijním právním řádem. Sportovní národnost bude zkoumána ve světle primárního i 
sekundárního práva EU a důraz bude kladen především na bohatou sportovní judikaturu 
Soudního dvora Evropské unie.  
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2. Právo na rovné zacházení bez ohledu na státní příslušnosti v právu 
Evropské unie a jeho vliv na pravidla mezinárodních sportovních 
organizací upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům 
Právo Evropské unie, respektive judikatura SDEU, urazily již poměrně dlouhou 
cestu v oblasti klubového sportu. V následujících odstavcích jsou vymezeny základní 
právní zásady řídící tuto oblast a jejich význam a spojitost se sportovní národností, jejíž 
zkoumání ve světle unijního práva je předmětem této práce.  
Principem, který je dle některých autorů352 jedním z nejdůležitějších hmotných 
práv přiznaných z historického hlediska právem Evropské unie jeho beneficentům a 
který sehrál v úpravě klubového sportu ústřední roli, je koncept práva na rovné 
zacházení bez ohledu na státní příslušnost. Na tuto právní oblast se legislativní činnost 
orgánů Evropských společenství (dnešních orgánů EU) zaměřila nejdříve353, společně se 
zásadou nediskriminace na základě pohlaví. Až v posledních zhruba dvaceti letech se 
pozornost více soustředí také na rovné zacházení bez ohledu na rasu, náboženství, 
sexuální orientaci či věk.354 
Ve Smlouvě o fungování Evropské unie (SFEU) je spatřován význam tohoto 
principu především v minimální garanci otevřenosti trhů jednotlivých členských 
států.355 První odstavec čl. 18 SFEU uvádí, že „v rámci použití Smluv356, aniž jsou 
dotčena jejich zvláštní ustanovení, je zakázána jakákoli diskriminace na základě státní 
příslušnosti.” Ačkoliv je jeho věcný rozsah stanovený relativně obecně, dle judikatury 
Soudního dvora (ESD) má čl. 18 SFEU vždy vertikální, a v některých případech i 
horizontální přímý účinek.357 V takovém případě směřuje jeho ustanovení kromě orgánů 
EU a členských států také k osobám soukromého práva, mezi které patří i sportovní 
organizace. Čl. 18 SFEU je subsidiárním článkem ke speciálním zákazům diskriminace, 
                                                
352 Srov. např. T. Tridimas (2006): op. cit., s. 118. 
353 Čl. 7 Smlouvy o založení Evropského hospodářského společenství z roku 1957: „V rámci působnosti 
této Smlouvy a bez ohledu na jakékoliv související speciální ustanovení je zakázána jakákoliv 
diskriminace na základě státní příslušnosti.“ 
354 P. Craig, G. de Burca (2011): op. cit., s. 612. 
355 J. Wouters, “The principle of non-discrimination in European Community law” (1999) EC Tax 
Review, Number 2, s. 101. 
356 Lisabonská smlouva pozměnila Smlouvu o EU a Smlouvu o ES a přejmenovala druhou uvedenou 
smlouvu. Nyní je EU založena na Smlouvě o Evropské unii (SEU) a Smlouvě o fungování Evropské unie 
(SFEU), Úřední věstník 2008, C 115, s. 1.  
357 T. Tridimas (2006): op. cit., s. 119. 
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které jsou obsaženy v dalších ustanoveních SFEU. Jedná se především o ustanovení 
upravující unijní občanství a volný pohyb zboží, osob, služeb a kapitálu. 
Podle judikatury ESD zakazuje čl. 18 SFEU nejen zjevnou diskriminaci na 
základě státní příslušnosti, ale také diskriminaci nepřímou, tedy jiná opatření, která 
vedou za použití jiných rozlišovacích kritérií ve skutečnosti ke stejnému výsledku. Tyto 
restrikce, mezi které patří například požadavek trvalého bydliště na území daného 
členského státu nebo registrace vozidla v daném členském státě, jsou pro cizince stejně 
diskriminační a byly by slučitelné s čl. 18 SFEU pouze tehdy, pokud by byly objektivně 
zdůvodnitelné a přiměřené.358 
Princip zákazu diskriminace na základě státní příslušnosti promítl ESD ve svém 
rozhodnutí Bosman359 z roku 1995 také na klubový sport, jemuž tím z pohledu 
evropského práva vytyčil do budoucna jasné směřování. V tomto rozsudku odmítl ESD 
akceptovat cizinecké kvóty v klubovém profesionálním fotbalu, které dle jeho názoru 
snižují šanci hráčů uplatnit se na pracovním trhu, a jako takové představují 
neospravedlnitelné omezení volného pohybu osob, respektive pracovníků.360  ESD se 
vyjádřil jasně pro zákaz takových opatření, která představují diskriminaci na základě 
státní příslušnosti a brání svobodám vnitřního trhu.361 
3. Obecný rámec pro posuzování souladu pravidel upravujících 
příslušnost sportovců k národním týmům s právem Evropské unie 
Pravidla upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům omezují 
možnost sportovců nabídnout své služby libovolné zemi v rámci Evropské unie.362 
Tento závěr vyvolává otázku, zda jsou pravidla upravující sportovní národnost 
v souladu s právem EU.363 Stejně jako v oblasti klubového sportu, i v případě pravidel 
upravujících sportovní národnost je řídícím principem zákaz diskriminace na základě 
státní příslušnosti. Jelikož se však tato obecná zásada uplatňuje pouze „v rámci 
působnosti Smluv“, je nutné postupovat za účelem posouzení souladu určitého pravidla 
                                                
358 C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., s. 249. 
359 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463.  
360 C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., s. 255.   
361 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, body 99 a 100.  
362 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., s. 220.  
363 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., s. 324. 
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s právem EU podle testu tří základních kroků, který je nejčastěji využíván v případě 
svobod vnitřního trhu a aplikuje se i v oblasti sportovních pravidel.364   
Nejprve je nutné zjistit, zda tato pravidla spadají do působnosti práva EU či 
nikoliv. Pokud ne, unijní soudní orgány nemají pravomoc o nich rozhodovat. Pokud se 
na ně však unijní právo vztahuje, je druhým krokem posouzení, zda tato opatření 
představují či nepředstavují omezení svobod vnitřního trhu. V případě kladné odpovědi 
je nutno zkoumat, zda jsou taková omezení ospravedlnitelná a přiměřená, a představují 
tak výjimku z pravidel vnitřního trhu.365 Tyto výjimky, které budou zkoumány 
v následujících kapitolách, jsou obsaženy jednak přímo v primárním právu, především v 
SFEU, a jednak také v judikatuře SDEU. Na základě uvedeného testu jsou v závěru této 
práce sportovní pravidla rozdělena do tří základních skupin vzhledem k tomu, jak se 
k nim pravděpodobně v budoucnu ve svém rozhodovacím procesu postaví SDEU.  
3.1. Výjimky ze zákazu diskriminace na základě státní příslušnosti ve 
Smlouvách 
Právní úpravě sportu v EU se explicitně věnuje čl. 165 SFEU, který zmiňuje 
jeho „zvláštní povahu“, avšak neobsahuje možné ospravedlnění omezení volného 
pohybu. Relevantními články Smluv jsou tak v tomto kontextu především čl. 45 a 56 
SFEU, které rozšiřují a specifikují působnost obecného čl. 18 SFEU v rámci volného 
pohybu pracovníků a služeb. Jelikož se však pravidla upravující sportovní národnost 
mohou týkat rovněž soutěžního práva, je třeba věnovat pozornost i čl. 101 a 102 SFEU, 
které tvoří páteř této oblasti v rámci Smluv. V tomto kontextu je důležité zmínit, že 
výjimky ve Smlouvách mohou ospravedlnit jak přímou diskriminaci na základě státní 
příslušnosti, tak také diskriminaci nepřímou.366  
Čl. 45 SFEU obsahuje čtyři důvody, pro které je možné omezit volný pohyb 
osob, respektive pracovníků. Těmi jsou veřejný pořádek, veřejná bezpečnost a ochrana 
zdraví dle odst. 3 a výkon veřejné správy dle odst. 4. Pro účely této práce jsou důležitá 
                                                
364 Ibid., s. 323 a násl. 
365 C. Barnard (2013), op. cit., s. 534 a násl.  
366 Ibid., str. 528. 
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především kritéria veřejného pořádku a veřejné správy, jelikož zbylá dvě kritéria jsou ve 
sportovním kontextu irelevantní.367  
 V kontextu výjimky spočívající ve veřejném pořádku sehrál důležitou 
roli ESD, který ve svém rozhodnutí Bosman v roce 1995 judikoval, že fyzické i 
právnické osoby, mezi které patří i mezinárodní sportovní organizace, se ve svých 
argumentech mohou spolehnout právě na toto kritérium.368 Dle sekundárního práva a 
judikatury SDEU však musejí být opatření přijatá z důvodu veřejného pořádku 
„založena výlučně na osobním chování dotyčné osoby.“369 Z tohoto hlediska by obecná 
pravidla upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům stanovená 
sportovními organizacemi byla v rozporu s právem EU, jelikož by se na ně výjimka 
veřejného pořádku nevztahovala.  
Ospravedlnění omezení svobod vnitřního trhu spočívající v kritériu zaměstnání 
ve veřejné správě nemá vzhledem ke sportu žádnou relevanci, jelikož reprezentace země 
ve sportovním utkání se až na výjimky370 nedá označit za výkon veřejné správy. Na 
činnost sportovních organizací se nevztahuje ani výjimka z povinnosti nebránit volnému 
pohybu služeb dle článku 56 SFEU. Toto ospravedlnění se dle článku 62 SFEU ve 
spojení s článkem 51 SFEU uplatňuje pouze na činnosti, které „jsou v příslušném 
členském státě spjaty, i když jen příležitostně, s výkonem veřejné moci“.371  
Pravidla upravující sportovní národnost spadající do působnosti práva EU, která 
určitá práva garantovaná právním řádem EU omezují, se nemohou spolehnout na 
výjimky explicitně stanovené ve Smlouvách. Kritéria veřejné bezpečnosti a ochrany 
zdraví nejsou v tomto kontextu relevantní a veřejný pořádek a výkon veřejné správy 
nejsou aplikovatelné.  
 
                                                
367 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., s. 338. 
368 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, body 99 a 100., bod 86. 
369 Čl. 27 odst. 2 Směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2004/38/ES ze dne 29. dubna 2004 
o právu občanů Unie a jejich rodinných příslušníků svobodně se pohybovat a pobývat na území členských 
států; Case C-348/96, Calfa, [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1999:6, bod 24.  
370 Pravidlo Francouzské fotbalové federace stanoví, že v případě nominace má hráč povinnost 
reprezentovat. Pokud tak neučiní, následují sankce stanovené veřejným právem. (Y. Hafner (2012): op. 
cit., s. 222). 
371 J.-C. Séché, “Quand les juges tirent au but : l´arret Bosman du 15 décembre 1995” (1996) Cahier de 
droit européen 355, Year 32, Number 3-4. 
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3.2. Výjimky ze zákazu diskriminace na základě státní příslušnosti 
v judikatuře Soudního dvora Evropské unie 
Důležitým pravidlem, které dle SDEU představuje v určitých případech výjimku 
ospravedlňující omezení svobod vnitřního trhu spočívající v nepřímé diskriminaci, je 
takzvané „rule of reason“.372 Základní tezí této doktríny je, že při posuzování jinak 
protiprávního jednání musejí být zváženy okolnosti, za kterých k jednání došlo. 
V následující části této práce jsou představeny jednotlivé rozsudky unijních soudů, které 
lemovaly cestu judikatury v oblasti sportovních pravidel až k přelomovému případu 
Meca-Medina & Majcen z roku 2006, který určil aktuální pohled ESD na tuto 
problematiku.  
ESD se otázky pravidel upravujících sportovní národnost dotkl poprvé v roce 
1974 v rozsudku Walrave,373 kdy posuzoval soulad stanov Mezinárodního cyklistického 
svazu s tehdejší Smlouvou o EHS. ESD v rozsudku judikoval, že pokud má sportovní 
činnost charakter zaměstnání za úplatu, vztahují se na ni veškerá ustanovení Smluv 
zakazující diskriminaci na základě státní příslušnosti.374 Zároveň však dodal, že se 
takový zákaz „nedotýká sestavování sportovních závodních družstev, zejména 
národních družstev, protože při sestavování těchto týmů jde o otázky, které sledují 
výlučně sportovní zájmy, a jako takové nemají nic společného s ekonomickou 
činností“.375 
Ve fotbalovém rozsudku Donà376 z roku 1976 ESD stanovil, že ustanovení o 
volném pohybu osob a služeb „nebrání pravidlům nebo praxi vylučující cizí hráče 
z možnosti účasti v určitých utkáních, a to z důvodů, které nemají ekonomickou povahu, 
a které se vztahují ke konkrétní povaze a kontextu takových utkání a jsou tím 
pádem čistě ve sportovním zájmu, jako například utkání mezi národními týmy 
z různých zemí“.377 
                                                
372 Soudní dvůr poprvé aplikoval pravidlo „rule of reason“ ve svém rozsudku C-309/99, Wouters and 
Others, [2002] EU:C:2002:98. 
373 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, [1974] 
EU:C:1974:140. 
374 Ibid., body 5 a 6. 
375 Ibid., bod 8. 
376 Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115. 
377 Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115, bod 14. 
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Z rozsudku Bosman je v tomto kontextu podstatný výrok ESD, ve kterém uvedl, 
že „ustanovení práva Společenství týkající se volného pohybu osob a ustanovení o 
volném pohybu služeb nebrání pravidlům a praxi, které jsou ospravedlněny 
neekonomickými důvody vztahujícími se ke konkrétní povaze a kontextu určitých 
sportovních utkání“.378 ESD navíc ve stejném bodě doplnil, že veškerá sportovní 
aktivita již nadále nemůže vzhledem k jejímu vzrůstajícímu ekonomickému dopadu 
spadat mimo oblast aplikace Smluv, a vyhnout se tak posouzení souladu s právem 
Společenství (dnešním právem EU) ze strany SDEU.379  
V této tendenci pokračoval ESD i ve svých rozsudcích z počátku nového 
tisíciletí Deliège380, Lehtonen381, Kolpak382 a Simutenkov383. Ani rozhodnutí Bernard384 
z roku 2010, v němž měl Soudní dvůr první příležitost reflektovat změny, které přinesla 
do unijního právního řádu Lisabonská smlouva, nepřineslo v tomto ohledu žádnou 
změnu. ESD s odkazem na rozsudek Bosman uvedl, že „s ohledem na cíle Unie spadá 
výkon sportovní činnosti do působnosti práva Unie tehdy, pokud představuje 
hospodářskou činnost“.385 
V případech ospravedlnění překážek svobod vnitřního trhu je důležité, že ESD 
již od rozhodnutí Walrave s poukazem na princip proporcionality konstantně judikoval, 
že výjimky týkající se národních týmů jsou takovými ospravedlněními pouze v případě, 
kdy zůstávají „omezeny na svůj řádný účel“.386 Aby mohl být takový požadavek 
naplněn, musejí být na jedné straně vymezeny metody interpretace takových pravidel a 
na straně druhé musí být vyjasněn koncept národního týmu.387 V případě pravidel 
upravujících sportovní národnost lze do té míry, do níž představují omezení svobod 
vnitřního trhu, využít mutatis mutandis stejné metody vztahující se například 
na zaměstnání ve veřejné správě. Dle generálního advokáta Trabucchiho musejí být 
                                                
378 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, bod 76. 
379 Ibid.  
380 Joined cases C-51/96 and C-191/97, Deliège, [2000] EU:C:2000:199.  
381 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] EU:C:2000:201. 
382 Case C-438/00, Deutscher Handballbund, [2003] EU:C:2003:255. 
383 Case C-265/03, Simutenkov, [2005] EU:C:2005:213. 
384 Case C-325/08, Olympique Lyonnais, [2010] EU:C:2010:143.  
385 Ibid., bod 27.  
386 Case C-36/74, Walrave and Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale and Others, [1974] 
EU:C:1974:140, bod 9. 
387 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., s. 229. 
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takové výjimky vykládány restriktivně ve světle pravidel konkrétní sportovní organizace 
a musejí být přiměřené vzhledem k zamýšlenému účelu.388 ESD specifikoval limity 
výjimek týkajících se národních týmů, když judikoval, že na dané výjimky „se nelze 
spoléhat v tom rozsahu, že by (z působnosti Smluv) vylučovaly veškerou sportovní 
činnost“.389 Toto tvrzení ESD dále rozvedl v přelomovém rozhodnutí Meca-Medina & 
Majcen z roku 2006.390 
4. Revoluce ve vztahu pravidel mezinárodních sportovních organizací a 
práva Evropské unie: rozsudek Soudního dvora Meca-Medina & Majcen 
Rozsudek Soudního dvora ve věci Meca-Medina & Majcen představuje 
významný mezník v historii posuzování souladu sportovních pravidel s právem 
Evropské unie. ESD tímto rozhodnutím rozšířil okruh pravidel, která spadají do sféry 
aplikace práva EU. ESD rovněž přesněji vymezil podmínky, které musejí být splněny, 
aby mohla být konkrétní sportovní úprava představující překážku svobodám vnitřního 
trhu či hospodářské soutěži označena za souladnou s právním řádem EU.  
Do roku 2006 se pravidla hájící čistě sportovní zájmy těšila své autonomii a 
právo EU se v této oblasti neaplikovalo. Po rozhodnutí Meca-Medina & Majcen již 
tento předpoklad automaticky neplatí. ESD na úvod potvrdil svoji předchozí judikaturu, 
podle níž „výkon sportovní činnosti spadá pod právo Společenství tehdy, pokud 
představuje hospodářskou činnost“. Přelomový okamžik přišel v bodě 27 rozsudku, kde 
ESD uvedl, že „pouhá okolnost, že pravidlo má čistě sportovní povahu, nevede k tomu, 
že se na osobu vykonávající činnost upravenou tímto pravidlem nebo na subjekt, který 
je vydal, nevztahuje působnost Smluv“.391 Soudní dvůr tímto výrokem posílil svou 
rozhodovací pravomoc ve sportovní oblasti392 a naznačil, že při zkoumání dopadu 
unijního práva na sportovní pravidla je nutné vzít v úvahu nejenom konkrétní pravidlo, 
ale i širší kontext, v němž daná úprava působí. V tomto případě se jednalo o soulad 
antidopingových pravidel se soutěžním právem EU. Celkový dopad rozsudku je však 
                                                
388 Case C-13/76, Dona v. Mantero, [1976] EU:C:1976:115, opinion of the Advocate General Trabucchi, 
bod 2. 
389 Case C-176/96, Lehtonen and Castors Braine, [2000] EU:C:2000:201, bod 34.  
390 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492. 
391 Ibid., bod 27.  
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pro právní úpravu sportu daleko významnější i vzhledem k možnosti aplikace jeho 
závěrů na oblast svobod vnitřního trhu.393  
V důsledku rozhodnutí Meca-Medina & Majcen se pod jurisdikci soudních 
orgánů EU dostala ještě širší skupina sportovních pravidel. Ve skutečnosti je oproti 
dřívějšku v současné době mnohem složitější posoudit, která ze sportovních pravidel 
sledují čistě sportovní zájem, nemají ekonomický dopad, a nejsou tak způsobilá 
právního posouzení ze strany SDEU.394 Bývalý předseda Mezinárodního olympijského 
výboru Jacques Rogge se před přijetím Lisabonské smlouvy snažil o to, aby byl sport 
jako takový z působnosti Smluv vyloučen s cílem zachování jeho specifické povahy. 
Členské státy však pod vědomím stále narůstajícího ekonomického dopadu sportu 
takový krok neučinily.395  
Fakt, že zmíněná sportovní pravidla spadají do působnosti Smluv, respektive pod 
ustanovení upravující soutěžní právo, ještě automaticky neznamená, že by unijní právo 
porušovala. Je třeba posoudit, zda jsou tato pravidla v souladu se zmíněnými předpisy. 
Vodítko k tomuto posouzení poskytl ESD právě ve svém rozhodnutí Meca-Medina & 
Majcen, když konstatoval, že stěžejní je zjištění, zda byla pravidla ve svém kontextu 
omezena na to, co je nezbytné k dosažení jejich legitimního cíle v souvislosti 
s organizací dané sportovní aktivity.396 ESD tak následoval názor již dříve vyslovený 
v rozsudku Wouters.397 Ten se primárně týkal problematiky výkonu advokacie, ale jeho 
závěry SDEU často využívá i při rozhodování v jiných oblastech. Cílem 
antidopingových pravidel je chránit zdraví sportovců a zajistit soutěžení za stejných 
podmínek pro všechny, což je jistě legitimní. Principu přiměřenosti však musejí 
odpovídat i prostředky dosažení tohoto cíle, tedy sankce za užití zakázaných látek.398 
Závěry ESD z rozsudku Meca-Medina & Majcen je možné aplikovat na 
ustanovení Smluv týkající se ochrany svobod vnitřního trhu. ESD totiž ve svém 
rozhodnutí dále uvedl, že „jestliže sportovní činnost spadá do působnosti Smluv, pak se 
na její podmínky vztahují veškeré povinnosti, které jednotlivá ustanovení Smluv 
                                                
393 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, bod 28.  
394 G. Infantino (2006): op. cit., s. 2. 
395 M. Beloff QC, “The Canniness Of The Long Distance Swimmers” (2008) Blackstone Chambers, s. 2. 
396 N. Beale, G. Duhs, “Meca-Medina & Majcen: Perspectives on how to apply the EC Treaty to the rules 
of sporting bodies” (2007) International Sports Law Review, Issue 2. 
397 Case C-309/99, Wouters and Others, [2002] EU:C:2002:98. 
398 M. Beloff QC (2008): op. cit., s. 2. 
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obsahují. Pravidla, která takovou činnost upravují, musejí vyhovovat všem požadavkům 
takových ustanovení, jejichž cílem je zejména zabezpečit volný pohyb pracovníků, 
svobodu usazování, volný pohyb služeb či svobodu hospodářské soutěže.“399 Analytická 
konstrukce Studie o rovném zacházení s osobami bez státní příslušnosti v individuálních 
sportovních soutěžích tento trend potvrzuje. Její autoři tvrdí, že závěry ESD v rozsudku 
Meca-Medina & Majcen, ačkoliv se v tomto případě specificky týkaly pouze soutěžního 
práva, mohou být v budoucnu využity při posuzování souladu pravidel upravujících 
příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům s ustanoveními práva EU týkajícími se 
pravidel upravujících svobody vnitřního trhu.400 Toto zjištění umožňuje předpovědět, 
jak může SDEU v budoucnu o těchto sportovních pravidlech rozhodnout.  
5. Regulační autonomie mezinárodních sportovních organizací při 
stanovení kritérií příslušnosti sportovců k národním týmům z pohledu 
práva Evropské unie 
V následujících odstavcích jsou vymezeny tři skupiny sportovních pravidel  s 
ohledem na to, jak by se k nim pravděpodobně postavil SDEU v okamžiku, kdy o 
takových pravidlech bude rozhodovat. Kritérium rozdělení je určeno podle toho, zda 
pravidla upravující sportovní národnost spadají do působnosti práva EU v oblasti 
vnitřního trhu a zda v takovém případě představují omezení volného pohybu. Pokud 
ano, je dále zkoumáno, zda jsou tato omezení ospravedlnitelná.  
5.1. Pravidla mezinárodních sportovních organizací, která nespadají do 
působnosti práva EU 
V návaznosti na rozsudek ESD ve věci Meca-Medina & Majcen spadají dle 
autorů Studie o rovném zacházení s osobami bez státní příslušnosti v individuálních 
sportovních soutěžích do této skupiny pouze sportovní pravidla „s žádným nebo pouze 
okrajovým nebo v jakékoli situaci pouze podpůrným a vedlejším ekonomickým 
                                                
399 Case C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina and Majcen v. Commission, [2006] EU:C:2006:492, bod 28. 
400 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 29. V rozhodnutí C-309/99, Wouters and Others, [2002] EU:C:2002:98 ESD poprvé 
judikoval, že pro výjimky v oblastech hospodářské soutěže a svobod vnitřního trhu mohou být uplatněny 
stejné ospravedlňující důvody. 
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dopadem nebo efektem. [...] Takzvaná „pravidla hry“ jsou dobrou ilustrací pravidel, 
která v tomto ohledu sledují čistě sportovní zájem.“401  
Stanovení technických pravidel upravujících průběh hry či soutěže je záležitostí 
spadající čistě do působnosti mezinárodních sportovních organizací. Jen ony odpovídají 
za stanovení rozměrů hřiště nebo charakteru nedovolených zákroků, za které se uděluje 
žlutá nebo červená karta. Reprezentace země je však činností, která určitý ekonomický 
efekt má,402 a pravidla upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům se tak 
nemohou octnout mimo sféru aplikace práva EU.    
5.2. Pravidla mezinárodních sportovních organizací upravující příslušnost 
sportovců k národním týmům, spadající do působnosti práva Evropské unie 
a představující omezení práv občanů Evropské unie, která mohou být 
ospravedlnitelná 
Tato skupina obsahuje ta pravidla upravující sportovní národnost, která spadají 
do sféry aplikace práva EU a představují omezení zákazu diskriminace na základě státní 
příslušnosti v oblastech unijního občanství, volného pohybu pracovníků, služeb, 
svobody usazování nebo soutěžního práva. Otázkou k posouzení je míra, se kterou 
sledují legitimní sportovní cíle, aby měly šanci projít testem SDEU z hlediska jejich 
souladu s právem EU.  
Koncept omezení nebo překážky v právu EU je velmi široký. Z pohledu svobod 
vnitřního trhu mají občané EU především právo pohybu a pobytu ve všech členských 
státech, ať už bez ekonomické motivace jako občané, nebo za účelem provozování 
ekonomické aktivity díky volnému pohybu pracovníků, služeb a svobody usazování.403 
V důsledku toho představuje každé pravidlo nebo opatření bránící občanům EU v plném 
využívání jejich práv omezení těchto práv, a musí být tudíž ospravedlněno.404 Příkladem 
pravidel sportovních organizací spadajících do této kategorie jsou pravidla upravující 
volbu unikátní sportovní národnosti a takzvané čekací lhůty.    
                                                
401 Study on the equal treatment of non-nationals in individual sports competitions, (Brussel: European 
Commission, 2010): 228. 
402 A. M. Mestre (2009): op. cit., s. 78.  
403 Case C-415/93, Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v. Bosman and 
Others, [1995] EU:C:1995:463, bod 95. 
404 C. Barnard (2013): op. cit., s. 456-537.   
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Při volbě jediné sportovní národnosti si sportovec vybírá, jakou zemi bude 
reprezentovat na mezinárodní scéně. Když si sportovní národnost zvolí, nemůže být již 
nadále vybrán do jiného národního týmu. Arbitrážní soud pro sport je toho názoru, že 
každý sportovec by měl mít v jednom momentu pouze jednu sportovní národnost a že 
její volba je legitimním mechanismem zabraňujícím tomu, aby si sportovci mohli dle 
libosti měnit svou sportovní národnost, či aby mohli být dokonce reprezentanty dvou 
zemí zároveň.405 Toto pravidlo chrání legitimní cíl v podobě regulérnosti a integrity 
mezinárodních sportovních soutěží a prostředky směřující k dosažení tohoto cíle jsou 
dle mého názoru přiměřené.406 
Dalším pravidlem spadajícím do této kategorie jsou takzvané čekací lhůty, 
jejichž účelem je zabránit sportovcům v libovolné změně příslušnosti od jednoho 
k jinému národnímu týmu v krátkém časovém horizontu. Hráč, který již některý národní 
tým na mezinárodní scéně reprezentoval, musí čekat určitou dobu, než může 
reprezentovat jiný národní tým. Toto pravidlo se snaží předejít situacím, kdy by se hráč 
pokusil změnit sportovní národnost krátce před důležitou sportovní událostí.  
Čekací lhůty se liší sport od sportu a pohybují se v rozmezí od jednoho do čtyř 
let.407 Z toho plyne, že v určitých sportech čekají sportovci déle než v jiných i přesto, že 
mají stejnou sportovní národnost. Přední evropský odborník na sportovní právo Stefaan 
Van den Bogaert tvrdí, že „poměrně často užívané tříleté čekací lhůty se zdají být 
přehnané“ vzhledem k délce trvání sportovní kariéry.408 Tato pravidla by při posuzování 
ze strany SDEU byla konfrontována s principem přiměřenosti. Důležitým měřítkem by 
byla periodicita, se kterou se opakují vrcholné soutěže v konkrétním sportu. Například 
čtyřletá lhůta v ledním hokeji se zdá vzhledem k organizaci mistrovství světa každý rok 
zjevně nepřiměřená. 
SDEU se zatím žádným případem, v němž by figurovala pravidla upravující 
unikátní sportovní národnost nebo čekací lhůty, nezabýval.409 Vzhledem k výše 
zmíněnému kritériu užitému v rozsudku Wouters není jisté, zda by čekací lhůty testem 
                                                
405 CAS 92/80, B. v. International Basketball Federation (FIBA), [1993], M. Reeb (Ed.) (1998): op. cit., s. 
304.  
406 A. Goetschy (2007): op. cit., s. 56.  
407 Příkladem sportu, kde je čekací lhůta čtyřletá, je lední hokej. IIHF Statutes and Bylaws 2014-2018, 
Bylaw 406, 1.3 (b).  
408 S.C.G. Van den Bogaert (2005): op. cit., s. 358.  
409 J. Guillaumé (2011): op. cit., s. 313-336. 
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proporcionality prošly či nikoliv. Pokud by je SDEU označil za rozporné s právem EU, 
potvrdil by v tomto ohledu praxi francouzských a rakouských soudů zmíněných 
v úvodu, a to i přesto, že v těchto případech byla sportovní pravidla nahlížena optikou 
pravidel upravujících státní občanství, a ne pravidel zajišťujících volný pohyb v rámci 
svobod vnitřního trhu EU.410 
5.3. Pravidla mezinárodních sportovních organizací upravující příslušnost 
sportovců k národním týmům, která představují neospravedlnitelná 
omezení práv občanů Evropské unie 
Absolutní zákaz změny sportovní národnosti a kvóty naturalizovaných sportovců 
v národních týmech jsou společně s některými čekacími lhůtami pravidly, která jsou 
vzhledem k porušení principu přiměřenosti s velkou pravděpodobností v příkrém 
rozporu s právem EU.411  
Soudní dvůr ve svém rozhodnutí Auer v roce 1979 uvedl, že „neexistuje žádné 
ustanovení Smluv, které v rámci působnosti Smluv umožňuje zacházet se státními 
příslušníky členského státu odlišně na základě času nebo způsobu, jakým získali státní 
příslušnost daného státu, pokud v době, v níž požívají výhod ustanovení práva 
Společenství, jsou držiteli státní příslušnosti jednoho z členských států a pokud splnili 
ostatní podmínky pro aplikaci pravidla, kterého se dovolávají“.412 Pro posouzení 
souladu sportovních pravidel s právem EU je důležitou otázkou, zda jsou státní 
příslušnost a sportovní národnost koncepty, které se překrývají. V kladném případě by 
totiž bylo možné závěry ESD z rozsudku Auer aplikovat i na pravidla sportovních 
organizací, která by v takovém případě porušovala právo EU. S kladnou odpovědí 
přichází Arbitrážní soud pro sport, zatímco francouzské a rakouské národní soudy 
zmíněné v úvodu tuto myšlenku zavrhují.413 
                                                
410 Conseil d’Etat, Number 101894, Olympique d’Antibes Juan-les-Pins c. Fédération Française de 
Basket-ball, [1989]; OGH, 2Ob232/98a, Emanuel V. v. Österreichischer Eishockey-Verband and 
International Ice Hockey Federation, [1998]; LG Wien, 26 Cg 94/87, Deutsche Eishockeybund DEB v. 
International Ice Hockey Federation, [1987]. 
411 A. M. Mestre (2009), op. cit., s. 78, viz také F. Latty (2007): op. cit., s. 684.  
412 Case C-136/78, Ministère public v. Auer, [1979] EU:C:1979:34, bod 28.  
413 Conseil d’Etat, Number 101894, Olympique d’Antibes Juan-les-Pins c. Fédération Française de 
Basket-ball, [1989]; OGH, 2Ob232/98a, Emanuel V. v. Österreichischer Eishockey-Verband and 
International Ice Hockey Federation, [1998]; LG Wien, 26 Cg 94/87, Deutsche Eishockeybund DEB v. 
International Ice Hockey Federation, [1987]. 
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Mezinárodní basketbalová federace (FIBA) a Mezinárodní volejbalová federace 
(FIVB) jsou příklady organizací, jejichž pravidla obsahují kvóty naturalizovaných 
sportovců – hráčů, kteří již dříve nastoupili za jiný národní tým a poté změnili státní 
občanství a tudíž i sportovní národnost. Tyto dvě organizace neumožnují národním 
týmům mít ve svých řadách více než jednoho naturalizovaného reprezentanta.414 Pokud 
by na tyto kvóty SDEU aplikoval své závěry z rozsudku Auer, musel by zákonitě 
konstatovat jejich rozpor s právem EU z důvodu porušení zákazu diskriminace na 
základě státní příslušnosti. Pokud by však SDEU dospěl ke stejnému závěru jako výše 
uvedené soudy ve Francii a Rakousku, na základě porušení práva na rovné zacházení by 
pravděpodobně rozpor s unijním právem neshledal.  
 V neprospěch dotčených sportovních pravidel je však dále třeba uvést, že 
například pravidla FIBA se uplatňují i na hráče, kteří nikdy nereprezentovali svou 
původní zemi na mezinárodní úrovni.415 Podobným případem může být sportovec, 
kterému není umožněno reprezentovat jeho zemi proto, že ke změně jeho státní 
příslušnosti došlo v důsledku změny státní příslušnosti jeho rodičů v době, kdy byl 
nezletilý. Ve světle výše uvedených faktů je zřejmé, že pravidla FIBA, respektive FIVB, 
nejsou omezena pouze na svůj náležitý sportovní účel dle kritéria z rozsudku Wouters. 
Jiná opatření představující menší omezení pro sportovce jsou jistě způsobilá dosáhnout 
stejného výsledku. V tomto ohledu lze uvést například takové opatření, které nebude 
bránit naturalizovanému sportovci reprezentovat jeho zemi proto, že dres té původní na 
mezinárodní scéně nikdy ve svém životě neoblékl.  
Mezinárodními sportovními organizacemi, které odmítají právo sportovců na 
změnu jejich sportovní národnosti, jsou například Mezinárodní ragbyový výbor (IRB) či 
FIBA. Ve druhém uvedeném případě je jedinou výjimkou, že se tento zákaz nevztahuje 
na hráče, kteří byli v době reprezentace své původní země mladší šestnácti let.416 
Otázkou je, zda jsou taková omezení přiměřená. Odpověď naznačil celkem přímočaře 
na kongresu v Lausanne v roce 2005 profesor Denis Oswald, který řekl, že „změny 
sportovní národnosti jsou legitimní [...] a ne všechny jsou výsledkem ekonomických [...] 
                                                
414 FIBA Internal Regulations (2014), Article 3.21.a, FIVB Sports Regulations (2015), Article 41.2.1. 
415 FIBA Internal Regulations (2014), Article 3.21.a. 
416 FIBA Internal Regulations (2014), Article 3.21.a. 
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zájmů. Nikomu tak nemůže být bráněno ve změně jeho sportovní národnosti a možnosti 
reprezentovat jinou zemi.“417  
V případě, kdy by byl SDEU konfrontován s těmito pravidly a praktikami, 
pravděpodobně by si vyžádal od mezinárodních sportovních organizací důkazy, které by 
demonstrovaly natolik vysokou úroveň nezbytnosti, aby umožnila těmto pravidlům 
projít testem přiměřenosti dle kritérií z rozsudku Wouters. Ty si však lze jen těžko 
představit a na základě výše uvedených zjištění je nutné konstatovat, že zmíněná 
pravidla upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům jsou v rozporu 
s právem EU. 
6. Závěr 
Rozsudek Soudního dvora ve věci Meca-Medina & Majcen z roku 2006 dal 
nový rozměr posuzování souladu pravidel upravujících sportovní národnost s právem 
EU. Vydláždil totiž cestu pro nový test pravidel upravujících příslušnost sportovců 
k jejich národním týmům v kontextu svobod vnitřního trhu.418  Ve světle současné 
judikatury ESD je pravděpodobné, že některá pravidla mezinárodních sportovních 
organizací by byla shledána jako rozporná s právem EU, pokud by se stala předmětem 
rozhodování SDEU. Pravidla upravující čekací lhůty, kvóty naturalizovaných sportovců 
či pravidla absolutně zakazující sportovcům měnit jejich sportovní národnost jsou 
v případě jejich nepřiměřenosti v rozporu se stanovenými ustanoveními Smluv 
upravujícími svobody vnitřního trhu, k jejichž ochraně je SDEU povolán.  
Soudní dvůr již ve své rozhodovací praxi ukázal, že se nebojí vyslovit rozpor 
sportovních pravidel s právem EU, pokud představují neospravedlnitelnou překážku 
svobod vnitřního trhu. V rozhodnutí Bosman shledal ESD přestupová pravidla ve 
fotbale v rozporu s volným pohybem osob, respektive pracovníků. V důsledku tohoto 
rozhodnutí došlo k výrazné změně organizace mezinárodních sportovních soutěží. 
Ačkoliv se v rozsudku  Bosman jednalo o klubový sport, SDEU by pravděpodobně ve 
světle rozhodnutí Meca-Medina & Majcen dospěl ke stejnému závěru i v případě 
pravidel upravujících příslušnost sportovců k jejich národním týmům.  
                                                
417 D. Oswald (Ed.) (2004): op. cit., s. 201. 
418 Y. Hafner (2012): op. cit., s. 237.  
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V návaznosti na takové rozhodnutí by byly mezinárodní sportovní organizace 
nuceny změnit svá pravidla a nahradit sportovcům škodu vzniklou jejich aplikací. 
Důsledkem by byla další výrazná změna v organizaci sportu na národní i mezinárodní 
úrovni.419 Organizace zaštiťující jednotlivé sporty jsou nyní na tahu. Jejich úkolem je 
přijmout komplexnější a jednotnější soubor pravidel upravující sportovní národnost 
ještě předtím, než Soudní dvůr shledá tato pravidla v rozporu s právem EU. 
Pravidla upravující sportovní národnost spadají do působnosti práva Evropské 
unie, a nemohou tak uniknout jurisdikci unijních soudních orgánů. Opatření, která 
představují překážku svobodám vnitřního trhu, musejí být ospravedlnitelná a přiměřená. 
V opačném případě porušují unijní právo. Každá mezinárodní sportovní organizace má 
pravomoc stanovit samostatně pravidla upravující příslušnost sportovců k jejich 
národním týmům ve sportu, který zaštiťuje. Alespoň do té doby, než soud rozhodne 
jinak. 
 
                                                
419 Y. Hafner (2008): op. cit.  
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Seznam zkratek / List of abbreviations  
 
Seznam zkratek: 
ESD Soudní dvůr 
EU Evropská unie 
SDEU Soudní dvůr Evropské unie 
SEU Smlouva o Evropské unii 
SFEU Smlouva o fungování Evropské unie 
 
 
List of abbreviations:  
CAS Court of Arbitration for Sport 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EU  European Union 
FFF Fédération Française de Football 
FIBA International Basketball Federation 
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
FIGC Italian Football Federation 
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Příloha č. 1 /Annex No. 1: List of international sports organizations 
 
International sports organizations can be divided into four groups: 
1) International sports federations recognized by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC)  
a) Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) 
Aquatics : Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA), Archery: World Archery 
Federation (WA), Athletics : International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), 
Badminton: Badminton World Federation 2012 (BWF), Basketball: International 
Basketball Federation (FIBA), Boxing (amateur): International Boxing Association 
(AIBA), Canoeing: International Canoe Federation (ICF), Cycling: Union Cycliste 
Internationale (UCI/ICU), Equestrianism: International Federation for Equestrian Sports 
(FEI), Fencing: Fédération Internationale d'Escrime (FIE), Football: Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Golf: International Golf Federation 
(IGF), Gymnastics: Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG/IFG), Handball: 
International Handball Federation (IHF), Hockey: International Hockey Federation 
(FIH), Judo: International Judo Federation (IJF), Modern Pentathlon: Union 
Internationale de Pentathlon Moderne (UIPM), Rowing: International Federation of 
Rowing Associations (FISA), Rugby: World Rugby (WR), World Sailing, Shooting: 
International Shooting Sport Federation (ISSF), Table Tennis: International Table 
Tennis Federation (ITTF), Taekwondo: World Taekwondo Federation (WTF), Tennis: 
International Tennis Federation (ITF), Triathlon: International Triathlon Union (ITU), 
Volleyball and Beach Volleyball: Fédération Internationale de Volleyball (FIVB), 
Weightlifting: International Weightlifting Federation (IWF), Wrestling: United World 
Wrestling (UWW). 
b) Association of International Olympic Winter Sports Federations (AIOWF) 
Biathlon: International Biathlon Union (IBU), Bobsleigh and skeleton: International 
Bobsleigh and Skeleton Federation (IBSF), Curling: World Curling Federation (WCF), 
Ice hockey: International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), Ice skating (including figure 
skating, speed skating, and Short-track speed skating): International Skating Union 
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(ISU), Luge: Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course (FIL), Skiing (including 
Alpine, Nordic combined, cross-country, freestyle, ski jumping and snowboarding): 
Fédération Internationale de Ski (FIS).  
c) Association of the IOC Recognised International Sports Federations 
(ARISF) 
Air sports (including aerobatics, air racing, ballooning, gliding, hang gliding, and 
parachuting/skydiving): Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI), Auto racing: 
Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA), Bandy: Federation of International 
Bandy (FIB), Baseball and softball: World Baseball Softball Confederation (WBSC), 
Basque pelota: Fédération Internationale de Pelota Vasca (FIPV), Billard sports 
(including carom billiards, pocket billiards/pool, and snooker): World Confederation of 
Billiard Sports (WCBS), Carom: Union Mondiale de Billard (UMB), Pool: World Pool-
Billiard Association (WPA), Snooker: International Billiards and Snooker Federation 
(IBSF), Boules sports: Confédération Mondiale des Sports de Boules (CMSB), Bocce: 
Confederazione Boccistica Internazionale (CBI), Bowls: World Bowls (WB), Boule 
Lyonnaise: Fédération Internationale de Boules (FIB), Pétanque: Fédération 
Internationale de Pétanque et Jeu Provençal (FIPJP), Bowling (Ten-pin): Fédération 
Internationale des Quilleurs (FIQ), Bridge: World Bridge Federation (WBF), Chess: 
Fédération Internationale des Échecs (FIDE), Cricket: International Cricket Council 
(ICC), DanceSport: International DanceSport Federation (IDSF), Floorball: 
International Floorball Federation (IFF), Flying disc: World Flying Disc Federation 
(WFDF), Karate: World Karate Federation (WKF), Korfball: International Korfball 
Federation (IKF), Life saving: International Life Saving Federation (ILSF), Motorcycle 
sport: Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme (FIM), Mountaineering: Union 
Internationale des Associations d'Alpinisme (UIAA), Netball, International Federation 
of Netball Associations (IFNA), Orienteering: International Orienteering Federation 
(IOF), Polo: Federation of International Polo (FIP), Powerboating: Union Internationale 
Motonautique (UIM), Racquetball: International Racquetball Federation (IRF), Roller 
sports (including inline hockey, roller racing, rink hockey, roller derby and artistic): 
International Federation of Roller Sports (FIRS), Squash: World Squash Federation 
(WSF), Sports climbing: International Federation of Sport Climbing (IFSC), Sumo: 
International Sumo Federation (ISF), Surfing and bodyboarding: International Surfing 
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Association (ISA), Tug-of-war: Tug-of-War International Federation (TWIF), 
Underwater sports: Confédération Mondiale des Activités Subaquatiques (CMAS), 
Water skiing: International Water Ski Federation (IWSF), Wushu: International Wushu 
Federation (IWUF). On all federations recognized by the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC), see also the IOC’s website: http://www.olympic.org/content/the-
ioc/governance/affiliate-organisations/all-recognised-organisations/.  
2) Federations recognized by the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) 
There are 11 international federations recognized by the IPC, while the IPC itself serves 
as the international federation for 9 sports. 
Alpine Skiing: IPC Alpine Skiing (IPC AS), Archery: World Archery Federation (WA), 
Athletics: IPC Athletics (IPC AT), Badminton: Parabadminton World Federation 
(PBWF), Badminton World Federation (BWF), Boccia: Boccia International Sports 
Federation (BISFed), Cycling: Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), Equestrian: 
International Federation for Equestrian Sports (FEI), Flying disc: World Flying Disc 
Federation (WFDF), Ice Sledge Hockey: IPC Ice Sledge Hockey (IPC ISH), Nordic 
skiing (including Biathlon and Cross-Country Skiing): IPC Nordic Skiing (IPC NS), 
Powerlifting: IPC Powerlifting (IPC PO), Rowing: International Rowing Federation 
(FISA), Sailing: International Federation for Disabled Sailing (IFDS), Shooting: IPC 
Shooting (IPC SH), Swimming: IPC Swimming (IPC SW), Table Tennis: International 
Table Tennis Federation (ITTF), Volleyball: World Organization Volleyball for 
Disabled (WOVD), Wheelchair basketball: International Wheelchair Basketball 
Federation (IWBF), Wheelchair Dance Sport: IPC Wheelchair Dance Sport (IPC WDS), 
Wheelchair curling: World Curling Federation (WCF), Wheelchair rugby: International 
Wheelchair Rugby Federation (IWRF), Wheelchair tennis: International Tennis 
Federation (ITF), Disability specific organizations: Football 7-a-side: Cerebral Palsy 
International Sports and Recreation Association (CPISRA), Football 5-a-side: 
International Blind Sports Federation (IBSA), Goalball: International Blind Sports 
Federation (IBSA), Judo: International Blind Sports Federation (IBSA), Wheelchair 
Fencing: International Wheelchair and Amputee Sports Federation (IWAS), Inas for 




3) SportAccord (GAISF) 
Federations which are members of the IOC (ASOIF, AIOWF and ARISF) are members 
of SportAccord, formerly known as General Association of International Sports 
Federations (GAISF). Moreover, several other federations which are not IOC members 
are members of the AGFIS, even if this is not a governing body of a sport. 
Aikido: International Aikido Federation (IAF), Bodybuilding: International Federation 
of Bodybuilding & Fitness (IFBB), Casting: International Casting Sport Federation 
(ICSF), College athletics: Federation Internationale du Sport Universitaire, 
Commonwealth Games: Commonwealth Games Federation, Dragon boat racing: 
International Dragon Boat Federation (IDBF), Draughts: World Draughts Federation 
(FMJD), Fishing: International Confederation of Sport Fishing (CIPS), Fistball: 
International Fistball Association (IFA), Floorball: International Floorball Federation 
(IFF), Flying disc: World Flying Disc Federation (WFDF), Football (American and 
Canadian): International Federation of American Football (IFAF), Go: International Go 
Federation (IGF), Ju-jitsu: Ju-Jitsu International Federation (JJIF), Kendo: International 
Kendo Federation (IKF), Kickboxing: World Association of Kickboxing Organizations 
(WAKO), Lacrosse: Federation of International Lacrosse, Labour Sport: International 
Labour Sports Federation, Masters Games: International Masters Games Association, 
Military Sports: International Military Sports Council (Conseil International du Sport 
Militaire), Miniature golf: World Minigolfsport Federation (WMF), Muaythai: 
International Federation of Muaythai Amateur, Panathlon: Panathlon International, 
Paralympic: International Paralympic Committee: Cerebral Palsy International Sport 
and Recreation Association, International Blind Sports Federation, International Sports 
Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability, International Wheelchair and 
Amputee Sports Federation; Powerlifting: International Powerlifting Federation (IPF), 
WUAP, GPC, WPC, Sambo: Federation International of Amateur Sambo (FIAS), 
Savate: Federation International De Savate, School Sport: International School Sport 
Federation, Sepak Takraw: International Sepaktakraw Federation (ISTAF), Ski 
mountaineering: International Ski Mountaineering Federation (ISMF), Sled dog sports: 
International Federation of Sleddog Sports, Soft Tennis: International Soft Tennis 
Federation (ISTF), Special Olympics: Special Olympics, Inc., Sports Chiropractic: 
Fédération Internationale de Chiropratique du Sport; or International Federation of 
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Sports Chiropractic, Sports Facilities: International Association for Sports and Leisure 
Facilities, Sports fishing: Confédération Internationale de la Pêche Sportive, Sports for 
the Deaf: International Committee of Sports for the Deaf, Sports Press: Association 
Internationale de la Presse Sportive, Timekeepers: Fédération Internationale des 
Chronométreurs, World Games: International World Games Association, Wushu: 
International Wushu Federation (IWUF)  
4) Other international sport federations 
O-sport: World O-Sport Federation (WOF), Arm wrestling: World Armwrestling 
Federation (WAF), Ham Radio Contesting, Amateur Radio Direction Finding & High 
Speed Telegraphy: International Amateur Radio Union (IARU), Australian rules 
football: AFL Commission, Bowling (Canadian five-pin): Canadian 5 Pin Bowlers 
Association (C5PBA), Beach Soccer: Beach Soccer Worldwide (BSWW), Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Behcup: World Behcup Federation 
(WBF), Broomball: International Federation of Broomball Associations (IFBA), 
Bodyboarding: International Bodyboarding Association (IBA), Bowls: Professional 
Bowls Association (PBA), Boxing: World Professional Boxing Federation (WPBF), 
Hapkido Boxing:Hapkido Boxing International Organization (HBIO), Correspondence 
Chess: International Correspondence Chess Federation (ICCF), Croquet: World Croquet 
Federation (WCF), Sqay: International Council Of Sqay (ICS), Darts: World Darts 
Federation (WDF), Electronic Sports: International e-Sports Federation (IeSF), 
Elephant Polo : World Elephant Polo Association (WEPF), Foosball: International 
Table Soccer Federation (ITSF), Rugby Fives: Rugby Fives Association (RFA), 
Football (Gaelic): Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), Goalball: International Blind 
Sports Federation (IBSA), Golf: The R&A; United States Golf Association (USGA), 
Greyhound racing: American Greyhound Track Operators Association (AGTOA), 
National Greyhound Racing Club (NGRC), Handball (court): Irish Handball Council, 
United States Handball Association (USHA), Harness horse racing: Harness Horsemen 
International (HHI), European Trotting Union (UET), Horse racing: International 
Racing Bureau (IRB), Horseshoes: National Horseshoe Pitchers Association of America 
(NHPA), Hurling: Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), Intercrosse: Fédération 
Internationale d’Inter-Crosse (FIIC), International Federation of Kitesports 
Organisations (IFKO), International game International Ball game Confederation 
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(CIJB) (Confederation Internationale du Jeu de Balle), International game International 
game confederation, International Game Fish Association (IGFA), International Gay 
Bowling Organization (IGBO), International Rope Skipping Federation (IRSF), 
International Pitch and Putt Association (IPPA), Jujutsu: World Ju-Jitsu Federation, 
Tchoukball: Fédération Internationale de Tchoukball, Kabaddi: International Kabaddi 
Federation (IKF), Lacrosse: Federation of International Lacrosse (FIL), Mallakhamb: 
Mallakhamb Confederation of World (MCW), Mixed martial arts: International Sport 
Combat Federation (ISCF), Modern Arnis: International Modern Arnis Federation 
(IMAF), Mountainboarding: International Mountainboard Riders Association (IMRA), 
Muay Thai: International Kickboxing Federation (IKF), Mountain running: World 
Mountain Running Association (WMRA), Paddleball: National Paddleball Association 
(NPA), Parkour: World Freerunning Parkour Federation (WFPF), Pesäpallo: 
Pesäpalloliitto, Pigeon racing: Royal Pigeon Racing Association (RPRA), Poker: 
International Federation of Poker (IFP), Pole dance: International Pole Sports 
Federation (IPSF), Practical shooting: International Practical Shooting Confederation 
(IPSC), Quidditch: International Quidditch Association (IQA), Quizzing: International 
Quizzing Association (IQA), Racketlon: International Racketlon Federation (FIR), 
Radio-controlled car racing: International Federation of Model Auto Racing (IFMAR), 
Rafting: International Rafting Federation (IRF), Rogaining: International Rogaining 
Federation (IRF), Rounders: National Rounders Association (NRA), Rock-It-Ball: 
International Rock-It-Ball Federation (IRIBF), Rope skipping: World Rope Skipping 
Confederation (WRSC), Rubik's Cube: World Cube Association (WCA), Rugby league: 
Rugby League International Federation (RLIF), Shinty: Camanachd Association, 
Shuttlecock: International Shuttlecock Federation, Skateboarding: World Skateboarding 
Federation (WSF); International Skateboarding Federation (ISF), Skibobbing: 
International Skibob Federation (FISB), Slot car racing: International Slot Racing 
Association (ISRA), Sport stacking: World Sport Stacking Association (WSSA), Table 
hockey: International Table Hockey Federation (ITHF), Table Soccer: International 
Table Soccer Federation (ITSF), Tent Pegging : International Tent Pegging Federation 
(ITPF), Throwball: International Throwball Federation (ITF), Boot throwing: 
International Bootthrowing Association (IBTA), Touch football: Federation of 
International Touch (FIT), Villowo: International Villowo Federation (IVF), Vovinam: 
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International Vovinam Federation (IVF)/The Vovinam-VietVoDao World Federation 
(WVVF), VX (sport): Global VX, Yoga:Yogasports Confederation of World (YCW). 
XXXVIII 
 
Abstrakt / Abstract  
 
Abstrakt: 
Tato diplomová práce hodnotí jev označovaný jako sportovní národnost 
z pohledu práva EU. Jejím cílem je posoudit soulad pravidel mezinárodních sportovních 
organizací, která upravují příslušnost sportovců k národním týmům, s konkrétními 
ustanoveními unijního práva. Jedná se především o ta ustanovení, která rozvíjejí zákaz 
diskriminace na základě státní příslušnosti v oblastech unijního občanství, svobod 
vnitřního trhu a hospodářské soutěže. Tato diplomová práce zároveň formuluje 
konkrétní doporučení pro mezinárodní sportovní organizace, jak lépe přizpůsobit jejich 
pravidla požadavkům práva EU.  
Tato diplomová práce ukazuje, že právo EU je aplikovatelné na pravidla 
upravující příslušnost sportovců k národním týmům vzhledem k jejich ekonomickému 
dopadu. Tato pravidla navíc představují překážku konkrétním oprávněním, které 
garantuje sportovcům unijní právní řád. V důsledku toho je třeba zvážit jednotlivé 
důvody a způsoby ospravedlnění těchto překážek. Soudní dvůr nabídl sportovnímu 
světu užitečný návod jak překonat test souladu sportovních pravidel s právem EU ve 
svém rozsudku Meca-Medina & Majcen z roku 2006. Soudní dvůr se v tomto rozsudku 
částečně odchýlil od své předchozí judikatury, rozšířil skupinu sportovních pravidel 
spadajících pod právo EU a stanovil čtyři kritéria, která je třeba vzít v úvahu při 
posuzování souladu sportovních pravidel s unijním právem – jejich kontext, cíle, 
inherentnost a přiměřenost.  
S vědomím těchto obecným závěrů rozděluje analytická část této diplomové 
práce pravidla upravující sportovní národnost do tří skupin podle toho, jak se k nim 
pravděpodobně v budoucnu postaví SDEU. Autor této diplomové práce dochází 
k závěru, že některá z těchto pravidel, konkrétně čekací lhůty, pravidla stanovující 
kvóty naturalizovaných sportovců a absolutní zákaz změny sportovní národnosti, 
porušují ve své současné podobě právo EU. Mezinárodní sportovní organizace by měly 
klást větší důraz na požadavky unijního práva, jelikož rozsudek SDEU prohlašující tato 
pravidla za neslučitelná s unijním právem by mohl znamenat nový rozsudek Bosman, 




The aim of this master’s thesis is to answer the question of how to grasp and 
categorize the concept of sporting nationality in the EU. Its goal is to consider 
compliance of the rules set up by international sporting governing bodies determining 
athletes’ eligibility in national teams with the concrete provisions of EU law. The 
provisions under scrutiny are mostly those laying down the prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in the fields of EU citizenship, internal market 
freedoms and competition. The master’s thesis simultaneously aims at suggesting 
concrete recommendations to international sporting governing bodies in order to better 
adapt their rules to EU law requirements. 
The authors of this master’s thesis first claims that rules governing athletes’ 
eligibility in national teams fall within the scope of EU law since they have economic 
impact and effect. Secondly, it is submitted that these rules limit athletes’ rights under 
EU law and constitute therefore a restriction to respective provisions of the EU legal 
order. That is why the question whether such a restriction to EU law may be justified is 
examined. In this respect, the Court of Justice provided sporting world with a useful 
manual on how to pass EU law scrutiny in Meca-Medina & Majcen in 2006. The Court 
of Justice switched the points of its previous case law, broadened the group of sporting 
rules coming under EU law and extracted four important elements that need to be taken 
into account when assessing sporting rules’ compliance with EU law – their context, 
objectives, inherence and proportionality.  
Working with the aforementioned general considerations, the analytical part of 
the master’s thesis divides the rules governing sporting nationality into three groups 
according to the future attitude of the CJEU to these rules, which might be expected 
towards the background of its current case law. The master’s thesis shows that some of 
these rules, notably certain waiting periods, quotas of naturalized athletes and rules 
prohibiting the change of sporting nationality, would probably be held incompatible 
with EU law in their current state. International sporting governing bodies should be 
therefore more attentive to EU law requirements since such a ruling of the CJEU 
declaring their rules contrary to EU law could represent another Bosman judgment 
flipping the world organization of sport upside down. 
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